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Abstract
We provide evidence that a bank’s subordinated debt yield spread is not,
by itself, a su!cient measure of default risk. We use a model in which sub-
ordinated debt is held by investors with superior knowledge (”informed
investor hypothesis”). First, we show that in theory the yield spread on
subordinated debt must compensate investors for expected loss plus give
them an incentive not to prefer senior debt. Second we present strong
empirical evidence in favor of the informed investor hypothesis and of the
existence of the incentive premium predicted by the model. Using data on
the timing and pricing of public debt issues made by large U.S. banking
organizations during the 1985-2002 period, we ﬁnd that banks issue rela-
tively more subordinated debt in good times, i.e. when informed investors
have good news. Spreads at issuance (corrected for sample selection bias)
react to (superior) private and to public information, in line with the
comparative statics of the postulated incentive premium. Interestingly, as
the model predicts, the inﬂuence of sophisticated investors’ information
on the subordinated yield spread became weaker after the introduction of
prompt corrective action and depositor preference reforms, while the inﬂu-
ence of public risk perception grew stronger. Finally, our model explains
anomalies from the empirical literature on subordinated debt spreads and
from market interviews (e.g. limited sensitivity to bank-speciﬁc risk and
the ”ballooning” of spreads in bad times). We conclude that a bank’s
subordinated yield spread conveys important information if interpreted
together with its senior spread and with other banks’ subordinated yield
spreads.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Over the last few years, economists have intensely debated the role of subordi-
nated debt as a vehicle for improved market discipline in banking.1 Some au-
thors advocate mandatory issuance of subordinated debt instruments by banks.2
Other proposals focus on the so-called yield spread, i.e., the dierence between
the yield on a subordinated instrument and the yield of a comparable risk-free
bond (like government debt). This yield spread is generally considered to be
a good measure of bank risk, as the holders of subordinated debt absorb the
ﬁrst loss (after shareholders) in the event of a bank failure. Consequently, some
authors have proposed a regulatory ceiling on banks’ subordinated yield spreads
(Calomiris, 1999) while others have argued that they would use such a spread as
an early warning signal and as a trigger for prompt corrective actions (Evano
and Wall, 2000).
Taking stock with respect to the ongoing debate, BoG/DoT (2000) con-
cluded that supervisory authorities would continue, “as part of the supervisory
process, to monitor both yields and issuance patterns of individual institutions”
(BoG/DoT, 2000, p. iv). Hence, it is of crucial importance to know what
observed yields and issuance patterns really foretell.
Proponents, as well as opponents, of mandatory subordinated debt proposals
seem to agree that, in theory at least, the subordinated debt spread measures
bank risk deﬁned as the expected loss to investors (i.e., the probability of default
times the loss given default).3 In practice, subordinated bond spreads may be
distorted by several factors: individual instrument characteristics, poor market
liquidity, investors’ risk aversion, and ﬂuctuations in the market price of risk.4
In the absence of such disturbances, however, for most participants in the debate
the subordinated bond yield spread accurately measures a bank’s risk.
In this paper, we try to show that the subordinated debt spread by itself
is not a su!cient measure of a bank’s default risk, since it is only meaningful
when it is used with both senior debt spreads and subordinated debt spreads
at other banks. Our starting point is the observation that subordinated debt,
by its very deﬁnition, does not exist alone, but only as one of at least a pair
of debt instruments. It is thus important to ﬁrst understand the reason for
the existence of dual debt before any inferences about yields are made. There
are several reasons why a bank may want to issue dual class debt, including
reasons that build on the heterogeneity of either investors, or of banks (see,
e.g. Diamond, 1993; Barclay and Smith, 1995; Winton, 1995; Birchler, 2000).
1For an overview, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (BoG) (1999) and
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and United States Department of Treasury
(BoG/DoT) (2000).
2For a textbook discussion of the incentive eects of subordinated debt, see Dewatripont
and Tirole (1994), section 13.3.1.
3See, for example, Campbell and Huisman (2003).
4Elton, Gruber, Agrawal and Mann (2001) estimate that less than 25 percent of corporate
spot spreads can be explained by expected default losses. They also demonstrate that the
sensitivity to factors commonly used to explain risk premiums in common stocks explains
between 66 percent and 85 percent of the spread in corporate and government rates that
is not explained by the dierence in promised and expected payments and taxes. By these
calculations, 15 to 34 percent of a typical corporate bond spread is left unexplained. In
addition, Hancock and Kwast (2000) report that subordinated debt spreads for large U.S.
banking organizations are sensitive to systematic risk factors such as stock market excess
returns.
2In what follows we will focus on the heterogeneity of investors. Our model
assumes that some investors have superior information.5 This assumption ﬁts
well with the dierent subordinated debt proposals: Subordinated debt can
provide market discipline only if its potential holders know more about the
quality of a bank than do other investors. The “informed investor hypothesis”
also ﬁts the data well: We ﬁnd strong empirical support for this assumption
in the pricing of public debt issues made by large U.S. banking organizations in
the 1985-2002 period.
In addition, our model allows for dierences in risk appetite (i.e., the “risk
aversion hypothesis”), for which we ﬁnd less empirical support. And, an alter-
native hypothesis — the “informed bank, or signalling hypothesis” — where banks
signal earnings prospects by choosing to issue either senior or subordinated debt
(see Barclay and Smith, 1995) is rejected by bond market data for large U.S.
banking organizations.
Regardless of the reason that a ﬁrm wants to issue subordinated and senior
debt, it must make both instruments su!ciently attractive for the respective
investors. Subordinated debt must “beat” not only risk-free alternatives, e.g.,
a Treasury bond, but, also must “beat” in the eyes of some investors its own
sister, senior debt. This is why its equilibrium yield spread contains not only a
risk premium (to make subordinated debt attractive compared to the risk-free
asset), but also an “incentive premium” (to compete with senior debt). Under
the informed investor hypothesis the incentive premium can be thought of as
an information rent earned by investors who have favorable information about
the issuer.6 Under the risk aversion hypothesis, senior debt pays a higher risk
premium which, like the incentive premium, also carries forward to the yield on
subordinated debt, even though the latter may be held by risk neutral agents.
We reject claims that subordinated debt spreads measure a bank’s risk as
perceived by sophisticated investors. Instead, our results almost literally sup-
port views formulated by market participats that signals from subordinated
debt spreads are jammed by movements in general market sentiment.7 Our
model shows that this “noise” reﬂects completely rational behavior on the part
of investors, notwithstanding the doubts of some observers.8 In addition, our
model yields predictions on banks’ issuance policies for subordinated and for
senior debt. According to the informed investor hypothesis, a bank would issue
subordinated debt upon receipt of good news and it would issue senior debt
5Diversity of information, and thus of opinion, probably is a factor behind the existence of
many ﬁnancial contracts and institutions (Allen and Gale, 2000) and behind some phenomena
of asset pricing (Diether, Malloy and Scherbina, 2002).
6It is a well known result from contracting models that among heterogeneous agents those
with superior information earn an information rent.
7In response to a request for comments on the feasibility and appropriateness of a manda-
tory subordinated debt policy, a U.S. Bank Holding Company stated that: “(T)he practical
issues associated with distentangling the separate inﬂuences of market factors and of changes
in the risk proﬁle of a ﬁnancial institution on its debt spreads would make such debt spreads a
poor tool for supervisory monitoring purposes.” (BoG/DoT, 2000, p. 78). Moreover, market
participants have noted that: “Spreads need to be interpreted with great care. For example,
the general level of spreads is quite sensitive to cyclical ﬂuctuations. In good times, spreads
tend to be rather narrow, reﬂecting the view that all banks and bank holding companies are in
good shape. In bad times, spreads balloon, reﬂecting broad skepticism regarding the ﬁnancial
health of banking institutions.” (BoG, 1999, p. 16.)
8In 2002, a U.S. Bank Examiner lamented: “The time-series movements of observed
subordinated debt spreads do not reﬂect changes in supervisory information. It almost seems
like stupid people buy and sell these bonds.”
3upon receipt of unfavorable news. This is because the bank would issue debt of
dierent priority status to separate investors with dierent, yet unobservable,
beliefs on the probability of its failure. Our analysis of U.S. bond market data
on the timing of public debt issues by large banking organizations suggests that
the health of the organization inﬂuences its bond issuance decisions, and these
decisions are usually consistent with the informed investor hypothesis.
One reason we focus on U.S. banking organizations over the 1985-2002 period
is because two regulatory reforms — capital-based prompt corrective actions by
bank supervisors (initiated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Im-
provement Act, FDICIA) and depositor preference rules (which established a
clear priority for the distribution of (unsecured) claims realized from the liqui-
dation or other resolution of any insured depository) were implemented approx-
imately in the middle of the sample period. These reforms would, of course,
inﬂuence investors’ perceptions about the likelihood of bank failures and their
prospective losses when bank defaults occur. As will be seen below, these percep-
tions importantly inﬂuence the magnitude of the incentive premium contained
in subordinated debt yields.
Our paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce our theoretical
model of the subordinated debt spread. In Section 3 we present the empirical
evidence on the risk-sensitivity of the issuance decision and of subordinated debt
spreads. In section 4, we discuss our results. And, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 Assumptions
There are several reasons why a bank may want to issue debt instruments that
dier with respect to their rank in the event of an insolvency.9 A plausible ex-
planation for the existence of dual class bank debt is heterogeneity of investors.
These individuals may dier in their preferences, wealth, sophistication, or in-
formation. In what follows, we will focus on dierences in investor opinion
assuming that some investors have superior information (i.e., the “informed in-
vestor hypothesis”). In addition, we allow for dierences in risk taste (i.e., the
“risk aversion hypothesis”). Unobservable heterogeneity of investors provides
the basis for partial investor separation through the use of dual debt, i.e., of a
senior and a subordinated instrument.
We use a variation of the Birchler (2000) model for the use of dual debt
instruments by a bank borrowing from investors having dierent information.
In this model, a bank can invest in a single one-period asset. The asset has




with Y> R > Y ,
where R is the return on a riskfree asset. We denote the prior probability of




> 0.5. The bank has no funds of its own, i.e. it
has strictly limited liability. In order to invest, the bank has to borrow from
a large number of small investors. We normalize their aggregate funds to one
dollar. The bank oers investors contracts on a “take-it-or-leave-it” basis. After
contracts are oered, but before investors have decided to invest or not, the bank
as well as some sophisticated investors get a signal on the project’s probability
of success. The signal updates p to either q(>p ) (good news) or (1  q) (bad
9For a short overview of the literature on debt priorities, see Birchler (2000).
4news). We denote the fraction of informed investors by h,o fw h o mf r a c t i o nu
get a good signal, and (1u) get a bad signal. Setting p = uq +(1 u)(1 q)
we assure that the dierent beliefs are consistent. We assume that all investors
are risk-neutral, but we will relax this assumption below.














=( 1 q)). In expected terms the three groups have size hu (op-
timists), (1  h) (uninformed), and h(1  u) (pessimists), respectively. Even
after the signal has occurred, the bank cannot distinguish investors. Yet, by
appropriate design of contracts, the bank can partly separate investors, i.e., it
can attract some but not others.10
We restrict asset payost om a k es u r et h a t :
1. The bank ﬁnds it worthwhile to borrow from uninformed investors and, a
fortiori, from optimists — a su!cient condition is that pY +(1 p)Y >R ;
2. The bank does not borrow from pessimists11 —as u !cient condition is
(1  q)Y + qY <R ;a n d ,
3. The bank cannot oer risk free contracts, even if all income in case of
failure (Y ) is promised to uninformed investors — a su!cient condition
is: R>Y /(1  k),w h e r ek =( 1 h)/[(1  h)+uh], the fraction of
uninformed in total depositors.
These assumptions also ensure that the bank is solvent if realized y = Y and
insolvent if realized y = Y .
2.2 Contracts
Contracts can be written only on observable outcomes, not on (unobservable)
types of investors. The bank can oer two contracts to separate the optimists












where the two elements, c1 and c2, represent senior (i.e., non-subordinated)
debt (c1) and junior (i.e., subordinated) debt (c2). It will turn out that unin-
formed investors prefer the senior contract, which is served ﬁrst in the event of
failure, while optimists prefer the subordinated contract, which pays more when
the banks’ project succeeds and the bank does not fail. The bank thus borrows
from uh informed and from 1  h uninformed investors. The fraction of in-
formed investors in total lenders (as distinct from the fraction in total potential
investors) thus is k = h/[(1  h)+uh].
We will refer to success and failure payments promised under contract i as
Di (face value of debt) and Mi (minimum repayment). The two contracts thus
are
c1 = {D1,M 1} and c2 = {D2,M 2}.
10Given any set of contracts, the bank, due to its limited liability, would borrow from all
groups of investors (as long as it promises less than Y ).
11In our model pessimists’ beliefs do not inﬂuence debt spreads; pessimists can only decide
not to buy debt, but they cannot sell bank debt short. Diether, Malloy and Scherbina (2002)
use a more elaborate model of heterogeneous beliefs in which the more pessimistic expectations
are not reﬂected in (stock) prices due to short selling constraints.
5The bank oers the contract menu that maximizes expected proﬁt condi-
tional on investors’ rational investment strategies and on the prior probability





Y  kD2  (1  k)D1
¤
+( 1 p)[Y  kM2  (1  k)M1] (1)
subject to participation constraints for both groups of investors ((2) and (3));
to incentive, or self selection, constraints ensuring that each group prefers the
“right” contract ((4) and (5)); as well as to limited liability, or wealth, con-
straints ((6) through (9)).
pD1 +( 1 p)M1  R  0 (2)
qD2 +( 1 q)M2  R  0 (3)
pD1 +( 1 p)M1  pD2 +( 1 p)M2 (4)
qD2 +( 1 q)M2  qD1 +( 1 q)M1 (5)
Y  kD2  (1  k)D1  0 (6)
Y  kM2  (1  k)M1  0 (7)
D1  0,M 1  0 (8)
D2  0,M 2  0 (9)
Proposition 1 (The optimal contract). The banker oers dual debt con-
sisting of a senior contract c1 = {D1,M 1}, and a subordinated contract, c2 =






















The marginal rates of substitution between success and failure income for
the bank, optimists and uninformed investors are MRSbank = (1  p)/p,
MRSg = (1  q)/q and MRSn > (1  p)/p, respectively. Therefore MRSg <
MRSbank <MR S n. Of all three parties, uninformed investors thus attach the
highest relative weight to income in case of failure. Therefore, they get all of
Y ,p l u sas h a r eo fY necessary to satisfy their participation constraint (2). Op-
timists get enough for (a) participation and (b) for not preferring c1;as (5) is
more restrictive than (3), (b) binds, hence the solution for D2.
6The two debt instruments are represented graphically in Figure 2.1. Lines p
and q are indierence curves for uninformed investors and for optimists, respec-
tively. As these indierence curves run through (R, R), they are the relevant
participation constraints. The senior instrument, {D1,M 1}, just satisﬁes the
participation constraint of uninformed investors. These investors get all avail-
able returns in the event of a bank failure, when total return Y is divided among
the uninformed investors.12 Subordinated investors get nothing in the event of
a failure.13 In the event of success, they must be paid D2 >D 1 to satisfy their
incentive or, self-selection, constraint, i.e., their indierence curve (q0)that runs
through c1. In contrast, their participation constraint (q)does not bind. It
is obvious from Figure 2.1, that the self-selection constraint is more restrictive
than is the participation constraint. Subordinated debt thus not only pays R/q,
but an additional premium D2  R/q, to make it attractive relative to senior
debt for the optimists. We will call this premium the incentive premium.T h e
fact that the terms of subordinated debt are determined by the incentive con-
straint, rather than by the participation constraint, is the main theoretical point
of this paper. We will use it to explain the impact of changes in dierent model
parameters on the subordinated debt yield spread.
Senior investors might be risk averse instead of, or in addition to being
uninformed. Risk aversion would change (2)into:
p(D1  )+( 1 p)M1  R  0 (14)
where  is the additional risk premium. From Figure 2.2, we can directly tell
what the impact of risk aversion on the part of uninformed investors (i.e., senior
investors)would be. Under risk aversion the uninformed investors’ participa-
tion constraint is not represented by the straight line p but by a concave line
p0. The optimal senior contract would thus be become c0
1. Consequently, the
relevant incentive constraint becomes q00. Subordinated debt holders thus get
the same additional risk premium as senior debt holders, even though they are
risk neutral! Any factor that increases the risk premium on senior debt also
increases the subordinated yield spread by the same amount.
The existence of an incentive premium as part of the subordinated debt yield
spread crucially depends on the assumption that the bank cannot distinguish
investors by their type. If it could, it could segment markets, which would re-
duce or, in the extreme, eliminate the incentive premium on subordinated debt.
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001)ﬁnd in a study on yield spread changes that bond
and equity markets might be somewhat segmented. One would also expect
segmentation between trade credit and publicly held debt, as public investors
cannot pretend to be suppliers and thus potential trade creditors. Some segmen-
tation between senior and subordinated debt markets thus cannot be excluded
ap r i o r i .
12There are (1 3 k) uninformed, while the fraction of informed investors is either k (after a
good signal)or 0 (after a bad signal).
13This is fairly realistic. For most banks k is small. The fraction of subordinated debt to
total assets (a proxy for k)for major banks in the US and in the EU is reported by Sironi






























Senior and Subordinated Debt Yields when
Investors are Risk Neutral
Figure 2.2
Senior and Subordinated Debt Yields when
Investors are RiskAverse2.3 Issuance decisions as a function of the signal
Strictly speaking, in our model investors decide about the bank’s liability struc-
ture. After a good signal, both, senior and subordinated debt are sold. After
a bad signal, only senior debt is sold. Speaking of the bank’s issuance decision
makes sense nevertheless. The bank designs and oers contracts; by doing so it
implicitly decides under what circumstances it will issue what kind of debt.
The composition of debt issued after the two possible signals, respectively,
are represented in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1
The Amount of Debt Issued as a Function of the Signal
Signal Senior Subordinated
good (1  h)u hu
bad (1  h)u 0
Given the overly simplistic model, there are only two possible liability struc-
tures, only one of which has subordinated debt. For the empirical part of the
paper it is su!cient to remember that the model predicts that subordinated
debt tends to be issued in good times, while senior debt is the main source of
ﬁnance in bad times.
2.4 Equilibrium yield spreads
The net contractual yield on a debt instrument is the dierence between the
contractual payment after success minus the original investment, expressed in
percentage points of the original investment.14 As all payosa r ep e rd o l l a r
and the original investment is one dollar, the yields on the two instruments
are (Di  1)/1. Yield spreads relative to the the safe asset are (Di  R).F o r
simplicity, we report equilibrium yield spreads for a risk neutral world, bearing
in mind that risk aversion of uninformed investors would increase the required
spreads on senior and on subordinated debt by .
From (10) to (13) we can derive the equilibrium yield spreads on the two
instruments. These are:
1 = D1  R =
1  p
p
(R  M1) (15)







Subordinated debt has the higher promised yield than senior debt, the dif-
ference being




This dierence is the joint eect of two opposing forces: On the one hand,
subordinated debt should pay more than senior debt when the bank is solvent,
14As usual in ﬁnancial markets, we use “yield” in the sense of contractual, i.e., promised
yield (in the event of a success), which is distinct from the expected yield (which includes the
possibility of failure).
9as it pays nothing in the event that the bank fails. On the other hand, subordi-
nated debt should pay less, since it is held by investors with relatively optimistic
expectations. Obviously, the subordination eect is generally stronger than is
the expectation eect.
This is conﬁrmed by comparison of the spreads on the two instruments to
their actuarially fair values. In a risk neutral world, fair risk premia just pro-
vide the investor with an expected return of R, the relevant expectation being
conditional on his state of knowledge. Fair premia (characterized by a bar) on
the two instruments are thus:
¯ 1 = D1  R =
1  p
p
(R  M1) (18)




The dierence between the two fair spreads







is negative, as the holders of subordinated debt are relatively optimistic. Fur-
ther, it is obvious that D1 = D1, and hence ¯ 1 = 1 as (18) is identical to (10).
As the senior contract is determined by the participation constraint, it just pays
the necessary risk premium. In contrast, (19) is not identical to (12). This leads
to the following proposition:
Proposition 2 (The subordinated debt spread). The yield on subordinated
debt exceeds the necessary risk premium, i.e.
2 > 2 =( 1 q)R/q (21)
Proof. The assertion follows directly from (16) and (19).
The bank must promise holders of subordinated debt not just enough to
make the subordinated contract (marginally) preferable to the risk free asset;
it has to promise more than R/q to make optimists prefer the subordinated
contract over the senior contract. The required incentive premium is equal to
















The incentive premium thus depends on the probabilities of default p and q (i.e.,
probabilities of default as perceived by uninformed and optimistic investors,
respectively) and on the expression in brackets which represents the potential
loss on the senior contract, or the “loss given default” in the terminology of
BCBS (2001).
The equilibrium spread on the subordinated contract over the yield of the
risk-free asset, 2, can thus be looked at from two sides. On the one hand,
i ti st h es u mo ft h es e n i o rs p r e a d( 1 = ¯ 1) plus the risk premium between
subordinated and senior debt. On the other hand, it is the sum of the fair
subordinated spread, 2, plus the additional incentive premium, ˆ 2,r e q u i r e dt o
induce optimists to prefer the subordinated contract; formally:
1 + 21  2  2 + ˆ 2. (23)
102.5 Sensitivity of debt yield spreads to model parameters
In this section, we look at changes in debt spreads in response to changes in the
parameters of our model. For example, the derivatives of the subordinated debt
spreads with respect to model parameters p, q,a n dY can be computed from
(19), (22), and (16).15 These derivatives and those for senior debt are presented
in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2 has ﬁve rows for each of the spreads under consideration. The
derivatives satisfy the same relation as the parameters themselves given in equa-
tion (23): The values for the subordinated debt spread 2 (between double lines)
are the sum of the two top rows for the senior spread 1 and the dierential
subordinated-senior spread 21; or, at the same time, of the two bottom rows
for the fair subordinated spread ¯ 2 and the incentive premium ˆ 2.
The columns for the dierent model parameters reveal several interesting
properties of the subordinated debt spread:
1. Sensitivity to public risk perception (p): The column for p shows,
that the subordinated spread, 2, rises when p falls, i.e., when the risk
perceived by the holders of senior debt increases (when the lines p and thus
q0 in Figure 2.1 move counterclockwise around coordinates (R, R)). The
subordinated debt spread thus rises with a deterioration in general market
sentiment, even though its holders (as well as the issuer) do not perceive
any change in the quality of the bank (i.e., in q). The (negative) sensitivity
of the subordinated yield spread with respect to p is particularly strong,
when p is small and when Y and k are small (i.e., when the bankruptcy
dividend to senior lenders is modest).16 Plus, sensitivity to p is strong
when senior investors are risk averse, as can be seen in Figure 2.2. The
subordinated spread is most sensitive to p when senior investors are risk
averse, but do not expect to get much in the event that a bank fails.
2. Sensitivity to informed investors’ risk perception (q): The column
for q shows that the subordinated spread, 2, rises when q falls, i.e., when
the risk perceived by subordinated yield holders increases (when lines q
and thus q0 in Figure 2.1 rotate counterclockwise around (R,R)). How-
ever, the sensitivity of 2 with respect to q is smaller than the fair risk
premium (based on the default probability perceived by holders of subor-
dinated debt) would suggest. This is because the incentive premium, ˆ 2,
moves in the opposite direction from the default probability perceived by
informed investors. The sensitivity of the subordinated spread to q also
depends on the senior bankruptcy dividend ( Y /(1  k)): If senior debt
holders expect a bankruptcy dividend that is large (that is, debt holders
expect to receive close to the risk-free return, R), then the subordinated
spread is not much above the fair risk premium, ¯ 2, and reacts strongly to
the default probability perceived by informed investors (i.e., q). In con-
trast, if senior debt holders expect a bankruptcy dividend that is small
(i.e., close to zero), the incentive premium almost cancels the impact of
15Recall that M1 = R 3 1
(13k)Y .
16Recall that R 3 1
(13k)Y = R 3 M1 is the shortfall of the bankruptcy dividend compared
to the risk-free return, and that we assume for simplicity that k, the fraction of subordinated
debt, is constant. It is also relatively small at most banks.
11Table 2.2
Derivatives of Spreads (in rows) with Respect to Model Parameters (in columns)



















































¯ 2 0  1
q2R  1
q2R 0
























12ﬂuctuations in the fair risk premium, and the subordinated yield spread
becomes insensitive to the default probability perceived by informed in-
vestors (i.e., q), while remaining sensitive to p.
3. Sensitivity to senior lenders’ bankruptcy dividend ( Y /(1  k)):
The column for Y shows that a higher bankruptcy dividend for senior
debt does reduce the senior spread, 1, and the subordinated spread, 2.
In contrast, the fair risk premium on subordinated debt (¯ 2)d o e sn o t
react to changes in Y , of course. But, via the incentive premium (ˆ 2), the
subordinated spread depends on a payment subordinated investors will
never get. It even reacts more strongly to the senior bankruptcy dividend
than the senior spread itself. These eects can also be shown in Figure 2.1:
The higher the bankruptcy dividend for senior lenders, the lower the payo
senior lenders need to get in the non-default state (D1), and the higher
the necessary incentive premium (as point (D1, D2) moves to the left).
Again, the subordinated spread is more sensitive to the senior bankruptcy
dividend if senior investors are risk averse: In Figure 2.2 the subordinated
spread falls by a larger amount with an increase in Y /(1  k) compared
to a corresponing movement in Figure 2.1.
4. Sensitivity to change in regulatory regimes: The implementation
of regulatory reforms17 during the mid-1990s provides us with an oppor-
tunity to consider their potential eects — through simultaneous changes
of several model parameters — on observed senior and subordinated debt
spreads. On the one hand, p and q have increased, as senior investors may
believe that the probability of bank failure is lower in the post-FDICIA
period because bank supervisors will undertake prompt corrective actions
when the ﬁnancial condition of a banking organization deteriorates. This
perception would result in a smaller incentive premium contained in sub-
ordinated debt spreads and in less risk sensitive subordinated debt yields.
On the other hand, Y /(1  k) has decreased as the lower liquidation
standing of senior debt investors, after the implementation of depositor
preference rules, would reduce the bankruptcy dividend for senior debt
(see Figure 2.3). As the bankruptcy dividend for senior debt falls, the in-
centive premium contained in subordinated debt spreads increases, while
the subordinated spread becomes more sensitive to p and less sensitive to
q. It is, of course, an empirical question whether these partly opposing
forces would cancel one another out, or whether one is much greater than
the other.
2.6 Quantitative importance of the incentive premium
We have found that, under the informed investor hypothesis, the subordinated
yield spread includes an incentive premium of yet unknown size. Before we
examine the empirical evidence, we try to get a reasonable guess on the size of
the incentive premium we should expect in practice.
From (22) we know that the incentive premium depends on p, q,a n do n
the bankruptcy dividend or its complement, the loss given default, for senior
debt. For most banks in industrial countries, survival probabilities p and q,o n
17For details see below.
13Figure 2.3
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14a ﬁve to ten year horizon are in the range of 90-99 percent, as implied by KMV
data. The denominator in (22) thus can be roughly approximated by unity.
The numerator, p  q,m e a s u r i n gt h ed i erence of opinion between optimists
and uninformed investors, depends on the quality of information available to
sophisticated investors and to the public, respectively. A few percentage points
looks like the upper limit, but 1-2 percent may seem a reasonable guess.
Data for loss given default are available from Moody’s (see Table 2.3). For
the period 1988-1991 (which falls into the pre-FDICIA period) recovery rates
for defaulted debt (in percent of the nominal value of debt) was 26.5 percent on
senior debt and 4.9 percent on subordinated debt.18
Taken together, these ﬁgures would suggest that, in the pre-FDICIA period,
incentive premia on subordinated debt for banks in industrialized countries were
in the range of 75 to 150 basis points. Hence, incentive premia seem to have sim-
ilar sizes as liquidity premia (see Covitz, Hancock and Kwast, 2001). Therefore,
they should be large enough to leave their traces in the data.
3 An empirical test of model predictions
3.1 Representation of model parameters in the data
To test our model we have to identify its parameters with observable variables.
The key parameters in our model are success probabilities p and q,a n dt h e
expected recovery rate on senior debt, Y /(1  k).
For expected recovery rates we have given some point estimates above. For
success probabilities, however, we need data on individual banking organiza-
tions. More precisely, we need to identify the success probabilities, or rather,
the corresponding failure probabilities perceived by informed investors and by
uninformed investors, (1q) and (1p), respectively, with some empirical risk
variables. Thus, our task is to split available risk proxies into information that
is only known to relatively sophisticated investors and into information that is
publicly known.
1. Publicly Available Risk Proxies
Quarterly balance sheet and income statement data for each banking or-
ganization i at time t are publicly available from consolidated ﬁnancial
statements for U.S. bank holding companies (FR-Y-9C). These data are
reported as of close of business on the last calendar day of the quarter.
Risk proxies typically derived from these data include the ratio of non-
accruing loans to total assets (NATAit), the ratio of accruing loans past
due 90 days or more to total assets (PDTAit), the ratio of other real estate
owned to total assets (OREOit), and the absolute value of the dierence
between assets and liabilities maturing or repricing within one year as a
proportion of equity value (AGAPit).
Also publicly available are data on the market value of common stock.
Using such data together with balance sheet information, the ratio of total
18Our assumption that subordinated debtholders get nothing in case of failure is thus a
reasonable approximation to reality. The data contained in Table 2.2 cover the entire 1985-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































16book liabilities to the sum of the market value of common stock and the
book value of preferred stock (MKTLEV it) can be computed.19
While all balance sheet risk proxies are derived from publicly avail-
able data, it is not necessarily the case that such information is commonly
known. Some risk proxies are highly correlated with widely known infor-
mation on regional and sectoral business conditions and their magnitude
c a nb ee a s i l yi n f e r r e d( e . g . ,OREOit). Other risk proxies may be so
broadly used that they are frequently reported in the press (e.g., MK-
TLEV it), and therefore, would not require a substantial investment to be
used by an investor. The remaining risk proxies would require an investor
to be able (and willing) to read a balance sheet statement (e.g., NATAit
and PDTAit). Such bank-speciﬁc risk measures are less likely to trickle
into the public domain.
2. Private Information
Bank supervisors regularly examine U.S. banking organizations and assign
conﬁdential ratings based on these examinations, balance sheet and income
statement information, and other publicly available information. Five
areas of each banking organization are rated: bank subsidiaries, other
nonbank subsidiaries, parent company, earnings and capital adequacy.
Therefore, the composite supervisory rating is known by the acronym
BOPEC.
Banking organizations with a composite supervisory rating of 1 or 2
are considered the safest and most well-managed institutions by bank su-
pervisors. And, banking organizations with composite supervisory ratings
of 3, 4, or 5 have moderate to substantial deﬁciencies that were uncovered
during the examination process. From these ratings we constructed two
indicator variables: (1) BOPEC2, equaled one if the composite supervi-
sory rating equaled 2, and zero otherwise; and, (2) BOPEC345,e q u a l e d
one if the composite supervisory rating equaled 3, 4, or 5, and zero other-
wise.
Supervisory ratings, BOPEC2 and BOPEC345, are the most private
information among our explanatory variables. We assume that they are a
reasonable statistic for the banks’ own knowledge of their riskiness. Al-
though it could be argued that these variables are proprietary information
of the bank, Krainer and Lopez (2002) have presented empirical evidence
that demonstrates that balance sheet, income statement, and stock price
information can be used to predict both supervisory ratings and their
changes four quarters prior to their assignment. This ﬁnding suggests
that these ratings are highly correlated with information that is available
to sophisticated investors.
3. Business and Bond Market Conditions
We used three quarterly measures of business and bond market condi-
tions, which are publicly available. First, aggregate business conditions
19Data on the market value of common stock are available on the Center for Research in
Security Prices (CRSP) tape that is published by the University of Chicago Graduate School
of Business.
17were proxied by the unemployment rate (UE). This measure was cho-
sen because it is a lagging indicator of business conditions as are bank
lending activities: Both commercial and industrial loans outstanding and
the ratio of consumer installment credit to personal income are lagging
indicators of business conditions.20
Second, the market risk premium was proxied by contemporaneous
stock market excess returns (XR). In each quarter, this premium was
measured using the quarterly average of daily excess stock returns (calcu-
lated as the dierence between the daily value-weighted return on NYSE,
Amex, and Nasdaq stocks and the o-the-run one month Treasury return).
And third, bond market conditions were proxied by an implied stock
volatility measure (MKTVOL). This measure was based on real-time S&P
100 (OEX) index option bid/ask quotes supplied by the Chicago Board
Options Exchange.21
3.2 The empirical model
3.2.1 The issuance decision
We posit that debt issuance decisions depend not only on publicly available risk
proxies for each banking organization (NATAit, PDTAit, OREOit, AGAPit,
and, MKTLEV it), private information (BOPEC2it and BOPEC345it) as well
as business and bond market conditions (UEt, XRt,and MKTVOLt),b u ta l s o
on banking organization-speciﬁc characteristics such as recent debt issuance
activities, bank size, and potential tax beneﬁts.22 Recent debt issuance activities
were allowed to vary across seniority grades (g, where g = E f o rs e n i o rd e b t
and g = U for subordinated debt) for each banking organization. For each
seniority grade, we constructed an indicator variable, ISSUEg,i,t1,t h a te q u a l e d
one when the banking organization issued debt grade g in the previous period,
and zero otherwise.23 And, banking organization size was measured using the
natural log of total assets, ln(ASSETit).24
Tax shelter beneﬁts for corporate debt imply that a banking organizations’
marginal tax rate will inﬂuence its choices with respect to debt or equity is-
suance. As a proxy for the marginal tax rate facing each banking organization,
we used its foreign and domestic income taxes as a percentage of net income
(AVGTAX it). And to account for dierences in capital structure across banking
organizations, we used the ratio of book equity to book total assets (K/Ait) in
the issuance decision model.
It is also expected that the interaction between banking organization-speciﬁc
risks and the market risk premium would also inﬂuence bond issuance decisions.
20See The Conference Board, U.S. Composite Indexes.
21Implied stock volatility is exogenous to, but highly correlated with, bond market volatility.
22To construct the issuance decision variables, ISSUEg,it, the CUSIP Masterﬁle was used
to identify all senior and subordinated debt issues by large U.S. banking organizations. Then,
for each debt issue, issuance dates were assigned using Moodys’, Fitch, Bloomberg, and Warga
databases.
23More explicitly, ISSUEg,i,t31 equals one if banking organization i issued debt type g in
either quarter t 3 2,o rq u a r t e rt 3 3, and zero otherwise.
24This proxy will also detect the risk reduction typically achieved by greater diversiﬁcation
at larger ﬁrms.
18Our issuance decision equations for both senior and subordinated debt are
assumed to be linear in all of the variables, or:25
ISSUEg,i,t = 0 +1 NATAit +2 PDTAit +3 OREOit +4 AGAPit
+5 MKTLEVit +6 XRt +7 XRt •NATAit +8 XRt •PDTAit
+9 XRt •OREOit +10 XRt •AGAP it +11 XRt •MKTLEVit
+12 BOPEC2it +13 BOPEC345it +14 ISSUEg,i,t1
+15 ln(ASSET it)+16 AV GTAXit +17 K/Ait
+18 MKTVOLt +19 UEt .
(24)
These equations were estimated using standard latent variable techniques,
which treat the decision to issue as a continuous unobserved variable that rep-
resents the probability that a banking organization issues debt type g.E a c h
of these probit models was estimated using quarterly data for the largest U.S.
banking organizations for the pre-FDICIA period (1985-1992) and for the post-
FDICIA period (1993-2002).
To ascertain whether parameter estimates were statistically dierent across
the two debt seniority grades in each period, we estimated a “stacked data
issuance decision model.” That is, we created a combined data set for each
banking organization that stacked its subordinated debt data set above its se-
nior debt data set (for each quarter) so that the combined data set could be used
to estimate an expanded model. The “stacked data issuance decision model” for
each banking organization has as the dependent variable the stacked issuance
decision indicator variables for subordinated debt (ISSUEU,t) and for senior
debt (ISSUEE,t). The explanatory variables included the original set of ex-
planatory variables (i.e., (NATA, PDTA, OREO, AGAP,a n dMKTLEV), XR,
(XR•NATA, XR•PDTA, XR•OREO, XR•AGAP,a n dXR•MKTLEV), (IS-
SUEg,t1,l n( ASSETS), AVGTAX, K/A, BOPEC2 and BOPEC345), (MK-
TVOL and UE)) and each of those explanatory variables interacted with a
senior grade indicator variable, I, that equaled one when g was senior and zero
when g was subordinated. With this speciﬁcation, the parameter estimates on
the interacted explanatory variables were signiﬁcant only when the individual
parameter estimates for the original issuance decision model are statistically
dierent when senior debt market data, rather than subordinated debt market
data, are used.
3.2.2 Issuance spreads
Issuance spreads are likely to depend on many of the same factors that inﬂu-
ence issuance decisions, such as the issuing banking organizations’ risk (NATAit,
PDTAit, OREOit,AGAPit,, MKTLEV it BOPEC2 and BOPEC345)t h em a r -
ket risk premium (XRt), bond market conditions (MKTVOLt), the frequency
of debt issuance (ISSUEg,i,t1), and bank size (ln(ASSETit)). In addition,
25For continuous right hand side variables, the average value for a two quarter interval
was used, and for binary right hand side variables, the average of the appropriate underlying
variable over two quarters was used. The left hand side variable was set equal to one if the
bank issues in a two quarter period and zero otherwise. To enhance the exogeneity of the
right hand side variables, explanatory variables were lagged by one quarter.
19observed issuance spreads will likely depend on the instrument characteristics
of the bonds that were issued, such as call options, time to maturity, coupon
frequency, and the amount issued.26 Because callable debt allows a ﬁrm to
reﬁnance it when the rate becomes lower, we included in our spread model an
indicator variable, CALL, that equaled one when an issue had a call option, and
that equaled zero otherwise.
To capture non-standard maturity eects on spreads, we used two indicator
variables: (1) an indicator variable for bonds issued with a maturity less than 10
years, MATLT10, and (2) an indicator variable for bonds issued with a maturity
greater than 20 years, MATGT20. Each of these indicator variables equaled one
for the speciﬁed maturity range, and zero otherwise.
It seems reasonable that coupon frequency could aect the types of investors
willing to purchase an instrument. To capture this potential eect on debt
spreads, we included two indicator variables, COUPON12 and COUPON2, that
equaled one when the coupon frequency is monthly and semi-annually, respec-
tively, and that equaled zero otherwise.
In addition, issuance spreads may depend on the amount of the debt instru-
ments that was issued. To capture this potential eect, we included the issuance
size of the debt instrument (ISSUESIZE).
The issuance spread on each bond was calculated using derived bond yields
computed by the Newton-Raphson iterative method from issuance prices and
an interpolated Treasury yield of the same maturity.27 The term structure of
Treasury interest rates was identiﬁed on each issuance date by using a smooth-
ing spline of the forward rate curve that incorporated a “roughness” penalty
determined by generalized cross validation. This splining technique is described
in Fisher, Nychka, and Zervos (1995).
Because issuance spreads are only observed for those banking organizations
that actually chose to issue debt, it is important to use a sample selection model
to analyze such spreads. We used Heckman’s two-stage method to obtain consis-
tent estimates of our sample selection model: This method involved estimating
the issuance decision equation described above (estimated with probit), and
then using the inverse Mills ratio function of the probit residuals as an extra
variable in a regression for the observed issuance spreads.
The regression estimated for observed issuance spreads over Treasury secu-
rities with comparable maturities for our two debt seniority grades was:
26Instrument characteristics for each subordinated and senior bond were identiﬁed using
Moody’s Default Risk Service (DRS) database, Fitch Investment Securities Database, Warga
and Bloomberg databases, as well as monthly issues of Mergent Bond Record over the January
1984-December 2002 period, inclusive.
27Issuance prices were obtained from various sources including Bloomberg and Moody’s
DRS. Yields for ﬂoating rate bonds are calculated by contract (i.e., a pre-speciﬁed number
of basis points above the LIBOR rate). The appropriate SWAP rate, from Bloomberg, on
the issuance date was used to convert the yield on each ﬂoating rate bond to its ﬁxed rate
equivalent.
20SPREADg,i,t = 0 +1 NATAit +2 PDTA it +3 OREOit +4 AGAP it
+5 MKTLEVit +6 XRt +7 XRt •NATAit
+8 XRt •PDTAit +9 XRt •OREOit +10 XRt •AGAPit
+11 XRt •MKTLEVit +12 BOPEC2it +13 BOPEC345it
+14 ISSUEg,i,t1 +15 ln(ASSETit)+16 MKTVOLt
+17 CALLit +18 MATLT 10it +19 MATGT 20t
+20 COUPON 12it +21 COUPON 2it +22 ISSUESIZE
+23 MILLSRATIOit .
(25)
As was done with the issuance decision model, we estimated a “stacked data
sample selection model” to ascertain whether parameter estimates were statisti-
cally dierent across the two debt seniority grades in each period. This stacked
model had as its dependent variable the stacked issuance spreads for subordi-
nated debt (SPREADU,t) and for senior debt (SPREADE,t). The explanatory
variables included the original set of explanatory variables (i.e., those indicated
in equation (25) above) and each of those explanatory variables interacted with
a senior grade indicator variable, I, that equaled one when g was senior and
zero when g was subordinated. With this speciﬁcation, the parameter estimates
on the interacted explanatory variables were signiﬁcant only when the para-
meter estimates for the original sample selection model for senior debt were
statistically dierent from those for subordinated debt.
3.3 Regulatory regimes
The key determinants of subordinated debt spreads — bank failure probabilities
and senior debt recovery rates — are heavily inﬂuenced by regulatory regimes.
The most relevant changes within our sample period are the introduction of the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) in 1991,
shortly followed by the enactment of depositor preference in 1993. To account
for this regulatory reform, we split our sample accordingly and refer to the
two subperiods as the pre-FDICIA (1985-1992) and post-FDICIA (1993-2002)
periods.
Bank failure rates in the pre-FDICIA period were generally higher than in
the post-FDICIA period. This is likely due to less favorable business conditions
or to less timely corrective action by bank supervisors. Given a bank failure,
investors expected lower relative losses in this period due to frequent resolutions
through purchase-and-assumption. Thus, reported recovery rates of about 25
percent for senior debt in this period may somewhat underestimate true recovery
rates inclusive of purchase and assumption resolutions.
The post-FDICIA period is characterized by prompt corrective action (PCA),28
higher barriers against bank bailouts, and depositor preference. These regula-
tory changes have dierent impacts on the variables of our model. Default
frequencies most likely have been reduced by PCA and the resulting regulatory
pressure on banks to raise capital before they become insolvent. The impact on
recovery rates, once default does occur, is less favorable for investors. Under
depositor preference, depositors (including the FDIC in receivership) are given
a priority claim on a failing bank’s assets. The holders of non-deposit liabilities
28The capital-based policy of prompt corrective action began in December 1992.
21only share what remains once depositor claims are paid o. Most of all, senior
investors seem to be worse o in a bank failure than they they were prior to the
implementation of depositor preference. Subordinated investors have a weaker
claim as well, but they could not expect to get much even before the implemen-
tation of depositor preference. With respect to risk characteristics, senior debt
thus is similar to subordinated debt in the post-FDICIA period.29
3.4 Hypotheses
3.4.1 The issuance decision
Expected Signs of the Parameter Estimates:
Although the magnitude of parameter estimates may vary across the regulatory
regimes, the expected signs of parameters in our issuance decision model are
generally the same for both senior and subordinated debt. The expected signs
of parameters for publicly available risk measures (NATAit, PDTAit,OREOit,
AGAPit,and, MKTLEV it) are negative because each of these measures reﬂect
greater risk and/or a deteriorating ﬁnancial condition for the banking organiza-
tion.
The expected sign of the parameters for stock market excess returns (XR)
is negative because this measure rises when the market premium for risk rises.
Moreover, the expected signs of parameters for risk measures interacted with
stock market excess returns (XR•NATA, XR•PDTA, XR•OREO, XR•AGAP,
and XR•MKTLEV) are negative since a banking organization experiencing ﬁ-
nancial distress may be much less likely to issue debt in a period when the
market risk premium is high compared to when this premium is lower.
In contrast, the expected signs of parameters for banking organization-
speciﬁc factors ((ISSUEg,i,t1), ln(ASSETit), AVGTAX it, K/Ait, BOPEC2it
and BOPEC345it)a r ep o s i t i v e . I ti sc o n v e n t i o n a lw i s d o mt h a ti s s u a n c ec o s t s
are lower for ﬁrms that frequently issue debt.30 In addition, issuance costs
may be lower for larger ﬁrms because major debt market investors typically
specialize in gathering information on a small number of ﬁrms.31 Holding a
banking organization’s capital structure (i.e., K/Ait) constant, the higher its
tax rate, the more it beneﬁts from being able to deduct the interest payments
paid to bondholders. At the same time, the less leveraged the ﬁrm is, the more
likely it can issue debt, so bond issuance activities would be positively correlated
with K/Ait. Regardless of the potential tax beneﬁts derived from debt issuance,
bank supervisors may pressure a banking organizations’ management to raise
regulatory capital. U.S. banking organizations are subject to Capital Adequacy
Guidelines that allow some debt instruments (e.g., mandatory convertible debt
securities and term subordinated debt) to be included in supplementary capital
(i.e., tier 2 capital). This means that not all debt instruments are equal from
a supervisory perspective when a banking organization is under duress. More-
over, core capital elements (e.g., common stockholders equity) are preferred to
any debt instrument in such circumstances. We would expect that banking
29We neglect that expected recovery rates on senior debt also depend on the fraction of
subordinated and of senior debt to total liabilities as well as on the expected shortfall of
assets with respect to liabilities.
30See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999, p. 46.)
31See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999, p. 47.)
22organizations with a composite supervisory rating of 1 would be least likely to
be under some pressure to improve their total regulatory capital.
And the expected signs of parameters for bond market conditions and macro-
economic conditions (MKTVOLt and UEt) are negative. This is because bond
market liquidity premiums tend to rise correspondingly with MKTVOLt and
because bank lending activities are highly correlated with lagging indicators,
such as unemployment.
The Pre-FDICIAPeriod:
Our “informed investor model” would imply that the bank borrows from unin-
formed investors (i.e., issues senior debt) when there is bad news with respect to
the ﬁnancial prospects of the ﬁrm. This suggests that the parameter estimates
for accounting- and market-based risk variables would jointly be positive in the
issuance decision model for senior debt.
In contrast, our model would imply that the bank borrows from informed in-
vestors (i.e., issues subordinated debt) when there is good news with respect to
the ﬁnancial prospects of the banking organization. This suggests that the pa-
rameter estimates for accounting- and market-based risk variables would jointly
be negative in the issuance decision model for subordinated debt. Moreover, in
such circumstances the banking organization would not borrow from uninformed
investors, i.e., it would not issue senior debt.
We thus postulate that subordinated debt would be issued in times when
private information contains good news, and senior debt would be issued in
times when private information contains bad news. If this is true, of course, the
rival model where subordinated debt is issued when a bank has adverse private
information (Barclay and Smith, 1995) is not plausible.
The Post-FDICIAPeriod:
In principle, prompt corrective action would reduce the frequency of bank de-
faults. Consequently, we would expect issuance decisions for both subordinated
and senior debt to be less risk sensitive in the post-FDICIA period compared
to the pre-FDICIA period. At the same time depositor preference lowered the
liquidation standing of senior creditors and made it more likely that such in-
vestors would incur losses in the event of a bank failure. In this case, we would
expect that the risk sensitivity of issuance decisions would become similar for
senior and subordinated debt.
3.4.2 Issuance spreads
Expected Signs for the Parameter Estimates
In the issuance spread regression, parameter estimates on banking organization-
speciﬁc risk proxies are expected to be generally positive. Even uninformed
investors should respond to risk proxies that are widely accessible and readily
attainable (e.g., OREOit and MKTLEV it). Thus, such risk proxies are ex-
pected to be positively correlated with observed issuance spreads, regardless
of the seniority of the debt instrument issued. In contrast, only informed in-
vestors should respond to risk proxies that are more private in nature (e.g.,
BOPEC2it and BOPEC345it). Such risk proxies are expected to be positively
correlated with observed subordinated debt spreads, but not to inﬂuence senior
debt spreads.
23The market price of risk is expected to be positively correlated with banking
organizaton debt spreads. If senior debt market investors are not risk averse,
then we would expect the parameter on the market price of risk to be insignif-
icant. But, if these investors are risk averse, the market price of risk parame-
ter would be positive and signiﬁcantly inﬂuence both senior and subordinated
spreads. Similarly, investor risk aversion would inﬂuence the signiﬁcance of the
bank-speciﬁc risk measures interacted with the market price of risk. Positive
parameters on these variables — separately or together as a group — would imply
that issuance spreads were relatively higher for riskier banking organizations in
periods when the market price of risk was high.
Frequent issuers and larger banking organizations are expected to have lower
issuance spreads than other banking organizations, holding all else constant.
This is because investors typically follow only a handful of ﬁrms and they prefer
to hold issues that are relatively liquid. Larger ﬁrms are able to issue debt in
larger issue sizes more frequently, and thus their debt issues tend to be quite
liquid.
Spreads tend to increase in periods when bond market volatility rises.32 It
is therefore expected that the parameter estimate for MKTVOLt in the spread
regression would be positive.
In addition, the observed issuance spreads for both senior and subordinated
debt issues are expected to be inﬂuenced by the characteristics of the individual
instruments that are issued. First, consider a ﬁrm that issues two instruments
simultaneously where one has a call option and the other does not. The in-
strument with the call option would be expected to have a larger spread than
the one that does not. Thus, it is expected that the sign on CALL would be
positive.33
It may be the case that bonds with non-standard maturities are less liquid
than those with standard maturities.34 This would suggest that the parameter
estimates of the indicator variables for maturities less than 10 years (MATLT10)
and for maturities greater than 20 years (MATGT20) would be expected to be
positive.
In contrast, smaller issues tend to rapidly get absorbed into investor port-
folios, such issues tend to be less liquid in the secondary market.35 For this
reason, smaller issues are more di!cult and expensive to sell to institutional
investors.36 Therefore, it is expected that issuance spreads are likely to be
negatively correlated with issuance size (ISSUESIZE).
32See Covitz, Hancock, and Kwast, 2001.
33A negative or zero coe!cient on the call option indicator variable would imply that debt
holders did not value the call option appropriately.
34Non-standard maturity instruments may be issued by banking organizations to match
the duration of their liabilities with the duration of their assets, or these instruments may be
issued when an organization wants to attract funds from small retail investors.
35Hancock and Kwast (2001) present histograms of weekly subordinated debt spread dis-
crepancies between Bloomberg and Interactive Data Corporation pricing data sources over
the January 1997 to October 1999 period for bonds stratiﬁed by issuance size. The tightest
distribution of spread discrepancies is for bonds with issuance sizes greater than $300 million.
The next tightest distribution was for bonds with issuance sizes between $100 million and
$300 million. And, the widest distribution was for bonds with issuance sizes less than $100
million. The decreased dispersion in spread discrepancies for larger issues suggests that there
may be a positive correlation between the ﬂow of trade in a particular bond and its amount
outstanding at issuance.
36See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1999, p. 46.)
24It seems reasonable that higher coupon frequencies (e.g., monthly payments)
would attract smaller “retail” investers, and the resulting higher demand would
lower the issuance spread. Therefore, the expected sign for the parameter
estimate of the monthly coupon payment indicator (COUPON12) would be
negative.
The Pre-FDICIAPeriod :
Depositor preference rules were not taken for granted in this period, so senior
debt holders are distinct from subordinated debt holders. In this case, we would
expect senior debt holders to focus on the publicly available and easily accessible
information. This is because senior debt holders have less of an incentive to
become informed when they are likely to rank with (uninsured) depositors in
this period. Senior spreads would also react to the market price of risk if senior
investors are risk averse. If a dierence in investors’ beliefs, not risk aversion, is
the main reason why banks issue dual class debt, we would expect no signiﬁcant
inﬂuence of the market price of risk on spreads.
Subordinated debt spreads, would also be sensitive to proxies of public risk
(including the market price of risk if senior investors are risk averse), as has been
shown in our model.37 At the same time, subordinated debt holders would, of
course, focus on their private risk proxies that are quite costly for them to obtain.
In their view, observed subordinated debt spreads would be unduly inﬂuenced
by the publicly available information and not fully reﬂect their own private
information. This suggests that the parameter estimates on the interacted public
r i s kv a r i a b l e sw i t ht h es e n i o ri n d i c a t o ri nt h es t a c k e ds p r e a dr e g r e s s i o nw o u l d
not be signiﬁcantly dierent from zero. But, the parameter estimates on the
private risk variables would only be signiﬁcant for subordinated debt spreads,
since these instruments are purchased by sophisticated investors. In the spread
regression for senior debt spreads, we would expect the parameter estimates on
the private risk variables to not be statistically signiﬁcant from zero.
Our model also suggests that spreads are more sensitive to risk measures
when both publicly and privately perceived risks are relatively high and when
both increase at the same time. In terms of the spread regression, we would
expect signiﬁcant eects for the banking organization-speciﬁc risk proxies inter-
acted with the market price of risk.
The Post-FDICIAPeriod:
After depositor preference legislation, all public debt holders are subordinated
to depositors, even those that are “senior” debt holders. Depositor preference
rules are thus expected to lower the recovery rate on senior debt in this period.
This impact of depositor preference would likely increase the incentive premium
contained in subordinated debt spreads. Hence, such spreads would be more
sensitive to the information used by senior investors, i.e., to publicly available
and accessible information on banking organization risk, and less sensitive to
private information gathered by informed investors.
At the same time, the premium between subordinated and senior debt would
become small as these instruments become more similar in their standing. We
would expect dierences in risk sensitivity between senior and subordinated
debt to be lower in this period.
37Given pre-FDICIA recovery rates on senior debt of around 25 percent, we would expect
the subordinated debt spread to be quite sensitive to publicly perceived bank risk.
25These expectations are derived under the assumption that senior depositors
still rely on the same kind of public information in this period. In a longer-term
perspective though, one should expect senior investors to become aware of the
weaker standing of their claims under depositor preference. This might give
these investors a stronger incentive to collect more private information on the
quality of banking organizations. Both, senior and the subordinated spreads,
would thus become less responsive to public information and more responsive to
private information. Investors who do not ﬁnd it worthwhile to collect private
information would likely replace senior debt in their portfolio by instruments
with higher rank in case of a bank failure such as certiﬁcates of deposit.
3.5 Findings
3.5.1 Trends in the data and distributions of spreads
Before turning to our parameter estimates, it is instructive to take a brief look
at the bond market data for large U.S. banking organizations over the 1985
to 2002 period, inclusive. First, it is readily apparent that the number of
large banking organizations that issue senior and subordinated debt instruments
varies considerably across time (Figure 3.1). Interestingly, it appears that
fewer banking organizations issue senior debt during periods when more banking
organizations issue subordinated debt.
The number of public debt issues made by large U.S. banking organizations
increased dramatically in the mid-1990s (Figure 3.2). In the late 1980s, it was
not uncommon for such organizations to collectively issue less than 20 debt
instruments in a year of each of the seniority grades. But, by the late 1990s,
there were several years in which large U.S. banking organizations collectively
issued more than 100 instruments in each seniority grade.
With the increase in the number of debt issues made by large U.S. banking
organizations per annum, there was less standardization in the contract terms for
both subordinated and senior bonds. Table 3.1 presents information on selected
contract terms and the number of subordinated instruments issued for each
year over the 1985-2002 period. In the mid-1980s, subordinated instruments
typically were issued with a maturity in the 10 to 20 year range, with no call
option, with semi-annual coupon payments, and with a ﬁxed rate of interest.
By the late-1990s, however, a higher proportion of subordinated instruments
were issued with maturities less than 10 years, with call options, with a ﬂoating
rate, and with coupons that were paid either monthly or quarterly. Similar
patterns emerge from consideration of the information contained in the Table
3.2. Compared to the recent past, senior debt instruments issued by large
banking organizations in the early years of the sample period were less likely
to have a maturity of less than 10 years, and more likely to pay coupons semi-
annually at a ﬁxed rate of interest. A comparison of Tables 3.1 and 3.2 suggests
that subordinated instruments tend to have longer maturities than those of
senior instruments, and that ﬂoating rate contracts are more prevalent near the
end of the sample period for both seniority grades.
Figure 3.3 contains box plots of observed issuance spreads for bonds in each
seniority grade for each year in the 1985:Q1 to 2002:Q4 period. These box plots
are graphical representations of the center and width of spread distributions
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2930which is the dierence between the third quartile and the ﬁrst quartile of the
data. This width widened in the period prior to 1992 for both senior and
subordinated debt spreads and then narrowed considerably when the ﬁnancial
condition of large U.S. banking organizations improved. Indeed, in the middle to
late 1990s the top quartiles for senior and for subordinated issuance spreads are
below the medians for such spreads (which are represented by bold horizontal
lines in the interior of each box) that were observed in 1991. The brackets
([ ]) for each box plot are located at extreme values of the data for the year
or at a distance equal to 1.5 times the interquartile distance from the center,
whichever is less.38 In most years, the top bracket for subordinated issuance
spreads is higher than the corresponding top bracket for senior issuance spreads
with exceptions occurring in 1990, 1991, 1996, 1998, 2001 and 2002. Throughout
the 1992 to 1999 period, these upper brackets remained considerably below the
medians for senior and subordinated issuance spreads observed in 1991.
3.5.2 The issuance decision
The issuance decision model was estimated using quarterly data for the pre-
FDICIA (1985:Q1-1992:Q4) and post-FDICIA (1993:Q1-2002:Q4) periods. Ta-
ble 3.3 presents parameter estimates for the issuance decision probit models
for subordinated and senior debt, equation (24). Dependent variables for the
separate probit models are the issuance decision indicator variables for subor-
dinated and senior debt, respectively. The left column of the table provides a
short description for each of the explanatory variables. The left panel of the
table presents estimates for the issuance decision model for subordinated debt
during each of the time periods considered, and the right panel of the table
presents estimates for the issuance decision model for senior debt during each of
the time periods considered. And, Table 3.4 presents parameter estimates for
the stacked data issuance decision model, where the dependent variable for the
stacked data issuance decision model is the stacked issuance decision indicator
variables for subordinated (ISSUEU,t)a n df o rs e n i o rd e b t( ISSUEE,t). Pa-
rameter estimates for the explanatory variables interacted with a senior grade
indicator variable, I, in Table 3.4 are signiﬁcant only when the individual pa-
rameter estimates for the original issuance decision models (in Table 3.3) are
statistically dierent when senior debt market data, rather than subordinated
debt market data, are used. Thus, parameter estimates in the stacked regres-
sion can be used to infer a “direct eect” for subordianted debt (left panel) and
an “additional eect” for senior debt (right panel) in each deposit insurance
regime.
Interestingly, there are some banking organization- or issue- speciﬁc factors
that inﬂuence the probability of issuance independently of the type of instrument
or the period considered. For example, ln(ASSETS) and ISSUE-1 are always
positive. This means that relatively large banking organizations among the 50
largest, and organizations that have issued in the past six months, are more likely
to issue debt. In addition, KA is always negative for subordinated debt, and in
the pre-FDICIA period for senior debt (though not signiﬁcant). This suggests,
albeit in the weakest manner, that higher capitalized banking organizations are
38For data having a Gaussian distribution, approximately 99.3 percent of the data fall inside
the brackets. Horizontal dashes represent “unusually deviant data points” that are further
than 1.5 times the interquartile distance from the center of the box.
31Table 3.3
 Parameter Estimates for the Issuance Decision Model
of Large U.S. Banking Organizations
Dependent Variable / Deposit Insurance Regime
Explanatory Variables Subordinated Issuance Senior Issuance
Pre-FDICIA Expected Post-FDICIA Expected Pre-FDICIA Expected Post-FDICIA Expected
85:Q1-92:Q4 Sign? 93:Q1-02:Q4 Sign? 85:Q1-92:Q4 Sign? 93:Q1-02:Q4 Sign?
Accounting- and Market- based
Risk Measures
The ratio of non-accruing loans to total assets 
(NATA) -4.389 X -15.983 X -21.964 X 24.391
(-0.69) (-1.23) (-2.95) (1.98)
The ratio of accruing loans past due 90 days of
more to total assets  (PDTA) -40.005 X 6.576 53.655 -18.278 X
(-1.47) (0.25) (2.04) (-0.68)
The ratio of other real estate owned to total
assets  (OREO) 1.700 27.098 -10.454 X -48.539 X
(0.12) (0.94) (-0.61) (-1.58)
The absolute value of the difference between
assets and liabilities maturing or repricing
within one year as a proportion of equity value 
(AGAP) -0.0001 X -0.035 X 0.004 -0.030 X
(-0.04) (-1.31) (0.72) (-0.94)
The ratio of total book liabilities to the sum of
the market value of common stock and the book
value of preferred stock (MKTLEV) -0.0005 X 0.023 -0.029 X -0.021 X
(-0.03) (0.82) (-2.33) (-0.66)
Bank-Specific Risk Measures Interacted 
with the Stock Market Excess Returns
The ratio of non-accruing loans to total assets 
interacted with the stock market excess return
(NATA_M) -0.785 X -0.081 X -0.521 X 1.047
(-1.30) (-0.03) (-0.70) (0.46)
The ratio of accruing loans past due 90 days of
more to total assets interacted with the stock
market excess return  (PDTA_M) 6.995 -1.136 X -0.722 X 0.762
(2.20) (-0.26) (-0.21) (0.19)
The ratio of other real estate owned to total
assets interacted with the stock market excess
return  (OREO_M) -1.949 X -1.806 X -0.447 X 2.984
(-1.38) (-0.26) (-0.25) (0.44)
The absolute value of the difference between
assets and liabilities maturing or repricing
within one year as a proportion of equity value
interated with the stock market excess return
(AGAP_M) -0.0001 X 0.001 0.001 -0.002 X
(-0.15) (0.15) (0.67) (-0.42)
The ratio of total book liabilities to the sum of
the market value of common stock and the book
value of preferred stock interacted with the stock
market excess return (MKTLEV_M) 0.002 -0.002 X 0.002 0.003
(1.16) (-0.60) (1.11) (0.93)
32Table 3.3 Continued
Dependent Variable / Deposit Insurance Regime
Explanatory Variables Subordinated Issuance Senior Issuance
Pre-FDICIA Expected Post-FDICIA Expected Pre-FDICIA Expected Post-FDICIA Expected
85:Q1-92:Q4 Sign? 93:Q1-02:Q4 Sign? 85:Q1-92:Q4 Sign? 93:Q1-02:Q4 Sign?
Other Banking Organization-
Specific Factors
The natural log of total assets (ln(ASSETS)) 0.574 X 0.552 X 0.821 X 0.297 X
(7.29) (11.54) (8.52) (6.16)
An indicator variable that equals one if the
banking organization issued debt in the same
seniority grade in the preceding 6 month period,
and zero otherwise (ISSUE_-1) 0.395 X 0.733 X 0.727 X 1.585 X
(3.31) (8.42) (5.95) (17.22)
Foreign and domestic income taxes as a
percentage of net income  (AVGTAX) 0.0001 X -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0002
(1.06) (-1.27) (-0.38) (-0.59)
The ratio of book equity to book total assets 
(KA) -4.359 -1.838 -7.956 4.459 X
(-0.66) (-0.57) (-1.17) (1.44)
Business and Bond Market Conditions
The unemployment rate (UE) -0.028 X 0.541 0.045 0.271
(-0.11) (2.86) (0.17) (1.34)
Stock Market Excess Return (XR) -0.024 X -0.002 X -0.009 X -0.017 X
(-1.41) (-0.11) (-0.48) (-0.81)
The implied stock volatility measure calculated
from option prices traded on the Chicago Board
Option Exchange (MKTVOL)  -0.051 X -0.004 X 0.002 0.010
(-2.58) (-0.21) (0.13) (0.57)
Supervisory Pressure
An indicator variable that equals one if the
composite supervisory rating equals 2
(BOPEC2) -0.138 X 0.049 -0.025 X 0.209
(-1.25) (0.56) (-0.19) (2.24)
An indicator variable that equals one if the
composite supervisory rating equals 3, 4 or 5
(BOPEC345) -0.510 X 0.089 0.194 0.424
(-3.05) (0.27) (1.04) (1.42)
Wald Tests
Wald test statistic for "risk" coefficients jointly
equalling zero 55.44 74.70 40.79 67.23
Critical value for the Wald test at the 5 percent
confidence level 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3
Goodness of Fit Measures
Fraction of correct predictions for issuance
decision 0.851 0.848 0.886 0.880
Number of Observations 1480 1933 1480 1933
R-Squared  0.21 0.31 0.21 0.35
Percent that issued debt of that seniority grade 16.89 21.83 13.11 17.43
Note:  All specifications include a constant term which was significant at the 5% level.  Year indicator variables, which were equal to one in a specific year of each panel, and zero 
          otherwise were also included though these coefficient estimates are not reported here.  Observed spread regressions are heteroskedastic-consistent.  t-statistics are in parentheses.
33                                                                        Table 3.4 
                     Parameter Estimates for the Stacked Data Issuance Decision Model for
                                                 Large U.S. Banking Organizations
Dependent Variable / Deposit Insurance Regime
Pre-FDICIA Period Post-FDICIA Period
Explanatory Variables
Direct Effect for Expected Additional Effect for  Expected Direct Effect for Expected Additional Effect for  Expected
Subordinated Debt Sign? Senior Debt Sign? Subordinated Debt Sign? Senior Debt Sign?
Accounting- and Market-
based Risk Measures
The ratio of non-accruing loans to total assets 
(NATA) -8.474 X -9.217 X -9.828 X 29.830
(-1.39) (-1.04) (-0.78) (1.71)
The ratio of accruing loans past due 90 days
of more to total assets  (PDTA) -49.698 X 109.530 9.831 -36.950 X
(-1.86) (3.03) (0.38) (-1.00)
The ratio of other real estate owned to total
assets  (OREO) 14.103 -40.190 X 33.754 -99.285 X
(1.01) (-1.89) (1.22) (-2.44)
The absolute value of the difference between
assets and liabilities maturing or repricing
within one year as a proportion of equity
value  (AGAP) -0.001 X 0.004 -0.028 X -0.013 X
(-0.27) (0.76) (-1.12) (-0.29)
The ratio of total book liabilities to the sum of
the market value of common stock and the
book value of preferred stock (MKTLEV) 0.013 X -0.043 X 0.014 -0.030 X
(1.03) (-2.67) (0.57) (-0.96)
Accounting- and Market- based
Risk Measures Interacted with
the Stock Market Excess Returns
The ratio of non-accruing loans to total assets 
interacted with the stock market excess return
(NATA_M) -1.207 X 1.003 0.289 0.711
(-1.96) (1.07) (0.11) (0.20)
The ratio of accruing loans past due 90 days
of more to total assets interacted with the
stock market excess return  (PDTA_M) 7.899 -8.592 X -1.304 X 2.190
(2.36) (-1.84) (-0.31) (0.37)
The ratio of other real estate owned to total
assets interacted with the stock market excess
return  (OREO_M) -2.113 X 1.079 0.486 -1.431 X
(-1.49) (0.48) (0.07) (-0.15)
The absolute value of the difference between
assets and liabilities maturing or repricing
within one year as a proportion of equity
value interated with the stock market excess
return (AGAP_M) -0.00002 X 0.001 0.0004 -0.002 X
(-0.02) (0.53) (0.12) (-0.44)
The ratio of total book liabilities to the sum of
the market value of common stock and the
book value of preferred stock interacted with
the stock market excess return (MKTLEV_M) 0.003 -0.002 X -0.001 X 0.003
(1.84) (-0.64) (-0.33) (0.72)
34                                                              Table 3.4 Continued
Pre-FDICIA Period Post-FDICIA Period
Explanatory Variables
Direct Effect for Expected Additional Effect for  Expected Direct Effect for Expected Additional Effect for  Expected
Subordinated Debt Sign? Senior Debt Sign? Subordinated Debt Sign? Senior Debt Sign?
Other Banking Organization-
Specific Factors
The natural log of total assets (ln(ASSETS)) 0.653 X 0.027 X 0.469 X -0.091
(10.50) (0.55) (12.40) (-2.58)
An indicator variable that equals one if the
banking organization issued SND in the
preceding 6 month period, and zero otherwise
(ISSUE_-1) 0.423 X 0.384 X 0.772 X 0.782 X
(3.68) (2.34) (9.15) (6.33)
Foreign and domestic income taxes as a
percentage of net income  (AVGTAX) 0.0001 X -0.0001 -0.0003 0.0001 X
(1.01) (-0.82) (-1.23) (0.27)
The ratio of book equity to book total assets 
(KA) 8.097 X -25.711 -4.227 X 11.216 X
(1.44) (-3.55) (-1.42) (2.95)
Business and Bond Market
Conditions
The unemployment rate (UE) -0.361 X 0.010 0.397 0.015
(-2.43) (0.11) (2.78) (0.19)
Stock Market Excess Return (XR) -0.024 X 0.024 -0.006 X -0.006 X
(-1.43) (0.96) (-0.34) (-0.21)
The implied stock volatility measure
calculated from option prices traded on the
Chicago Board Option Exchange (MKTVOL)  -0.047 X 0.062 -0.006 X 0.019
(-3.05) (3.78) (-0.43) (1.37)
Supervisory Pressure
An indicator variable that equals one if the
composite supervisory rating equals 2
(BOPEC2) 0.007 -0.201 X 0.044 0.185
(0.06) (-1.30) (0.53) (1.53)
An indicator variable that equals one if the
composite supervisory rating equals 3, 4 or 5
(BOPEC345) -0.293 X 0.263 0.071 0.397
(-1.81) (1.16) (0.22) (0.93)
Goodness of Fit Measures
Fraction of correct predictions for issuance
decision 0.870 0.865
Number of Observations 2960 3866
R-Squared  0.202 0.325
Percent that issued debt instrument 16.89 21.83 13.11 17.43
Note:  All specifications include a constant term which was significant at the 5% level.  Year indicator variables, which were equal to one in a specific year of each panel, and zero 
        otherwise were also included though these coefficient estimates are not reported here.  Observed spread regressions are heteroskedastic-consistent.  t-statistics are in parentheses.
35more likely to issue debt than are less well capitalized organizations.
In the pre-FDICIA period, at least three out of ﬁve of the banking organization-
speciﬁc variables have the expected sign for either subordinated or senior issues.
A Wald test (Table 3.5) for the joint impact of these ﬁve variables yields a (non-
signiﬁcant) negative result for subordinated issues and a signiﬁcant positive re-
sult for senior issues. This implies that banks with negative news tended to
issue senior debt during this period. Interestingly, among the individual coe!-
cients, the most privately known, NATA and PDTA,h a v ean e g a t i v es i g ni nt h e
column for subordinated issues, while one of the publicly accessible variables,
MKTLEV has a negative sign and is statistically signiﬁcant in the column for
senior issuance.39 These results suggest that banks’ preference for senior debt
in times of relatively adverse information is stronger when bad news is private
than when bad news is public. Moreover, the general preference for subordi-
nated debt in good, and senior debt in bad times is conﬁrmed by the proxies
for public risk perception: parameter estimates for UE and MKTVOL are both
negative and the estimate for MKTVOL is signiﬁcantly negative for subordi-
nated debt in this period. And, the signiﬁcant and negative parameter estimate
for BOPEC345 during this period further conﬁrms that the riskiest banks did
not take advantage of adverse insider information by issuing subordinated debt.
In contrast, the market price of risk (XR) is not signiﬁcant, nor are the joint
impact of the interaction terms with banking organization-speciﬁc risk variables
(these interacted variables are marked by the su!x _M) signiﬁcant.40
Taken together, these empirical ﬁndings mean that the “informed investor
hypothesis” is well conﬁrmed by the data in the pre-FDICIA period. In times
of unfavorable information, banks do not, or cannot issue subordinated debt.
Or, subordinated debt may be e!ciently priced while senior debt is underpriced
in bad times. In addition, we ﬁnd scant evidence to support the “risk aversion
hypothesis.” Moreover, the “signalling hypothesis,” which would predict more
subordinated issues in times when banks have bad private information, is clearly
rejected for this period.
In the post-FDICIA period, four out of ﬁve of the banking organization-
speciﬁc risk variables have a sign that is consistent with the substitution eect
between subordinated and senior debt that was detected in the pre-FDICIA
period.41 However, in the post-FDICIA period the joint impact of these vari-
ables ceases to be signiﬁcant in a Wald test (Table 3.5) and the direction of the
impact even changes signs.42
In the post-FDICIA period, the eects of bond and business market con-
39In the stacked data model, Table 3.4, the senior debt indicator interacted risk variables
for PDTA and MARKTLEV are statistically signiﬁcant in opposing directions.
40A Wald test for the joint eect of the interacted terms yields a positive sign for subordi-
nated debt and a negative sign for senior debt, neither of which is signiﬁcant.
41In the stacked data models, only one of the parameter estimates for senior debt banking
organization-speciﬁc risk variables (OREO) was signiﬁcantly dierent from subordinated debt
banking organization-speciﬁc risk variables in the post-FDICIA period.
42These ﬁndings were also conﬁrmed using a multinomial logit regression model where
banking organizations could chose to (1) issue no public debt, (2) to issue only senior debt, (3)
to issue only subordinated debt, or (4) to issue both senior and subordinated debt instruments.
The joint marginal eects of the banking organization-speciﬁc risk proxies and of said risk
proxies interacted with the market price of risk were of the same signs as were obtained using
the separate probit models in each period that are reported in Table 3.3. Therefore, the
parameter estimates for the logit model support the view that banking organizations substitute
between senior and subordinated debt issuance activities as their ﬁnancial condition evolves.
36Table 3.5
Hypotheses, Wald Test Statistics, Critical Values and Sign Tests for Joint Effects
in the Issuance Decision Models
Pre-FDICIA Period:  1985:Q1 - 1992:Q4 Post-FDICIA Period:  1993:Q1 - 2002:Q4
Hypothesis Test Critical Value for Joint Test Critical Value for Joint
Statistic a 5 Percent Effect Statistic a 5 Percent Effect
Confidence Level Confidence Level
H1: The parameter estimates for accounting- 
and market-based risk variables jointly  4.24 11.1 Negative 9.06 11.1 Positive
equal zero in the model for 
subordinated debt.
H2: The parameter estimates for accounting- 
and market-based risk variables jointly  30.00 11.1 Positive 10.36 11.1 Negative
equal zero in the model for 
senior debt.
37ditions and of private information on debt issuance decisions are either fairly
weak or quite unexpected. Although bond market volatility signiﬁcantly re-
duced subordinated debt issuance activities in the pre-FDICIA period, the pa-
rameter estimate for MKTVOL was insigniﬁcant in the post-FDICIA period.
Moreover, such activities were (unexpectedly) positively correlated with the
unemployment rate (UE) in the post-FDICIA period. Interestingly, the super-
visory indicator variables did not inﬂuence subordinated debt issuance activities
in the post-FDICIA period, but BOPEC2 signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced senior debt is-
suance activities, though this eect was not substantially dierent in the stacked
issuance model (Table 3.4).43
Taken together, the issuance decision parameter estimates conﬁrm our ex-
pectation that senior and subordinated debt would become more similar un-
der recent the regulatory reforms that implemented depositor preference and
capital-based prompt corrective actions by bank supervisors. Publicly perceived
risk does not appear to favor senior over subordinated debt any more. Only
the most private bad information (represented by the BOPEC variables) still
prompts banking organizations to prefer to issue senior debt.
3.5.3 Issuance spreads
Table 3.6 presents parameter estimates for the sample selection models for sub-
ordinated and senior debt spreads, equation (25). These models were estimated
for the pre-FDICIA (1985:Q1- 1992:Q4) and post-FDICIA (1993:Q1-2002:Q4)
periods using data on issuance spreads for all subordindated instruments, for
only subordinated instruments with an issuance size of at least $75 million USD,
and for all senior instruments issued by large U.S. banking organizations. As
with Tables 3.3 and 3.4, the left column of the table provides a short descrip-
tion for each of the explanatory variables. The left panel of the table presents
estimates for the sample selection model for subordinated debt during each of
the time periods considered, and the right panel of the table presents estimates
for the sample selection model for senior debt during each of the time peri-
ods considered. And, Table 3.7 presents parameter estimates for the stacked
data sample selection models. The dependent variables for the stacked sam-
ple selection model are the stacked observed issuance spreads for subordinated
(SPREADU,i,t)a n df o rs e n i o rd e b t( SPREADE,i,t). Parameter estimates for
the explanatory variables interacted with a senior grade indicator variable, I,i n
Table 3.7 are signiﬁcant only when the individual parameter estimates for the
original sample selection models (in Table 3.6) are statistically dierent when
senior debt market data, rather than subordinated debt market data, are used.
T h u s ,p a r a m e t e re s t i m a t e si nt h es t a c k e dr e g r e s s i o nc a nb eu s e dt oi n f e ra“ d i -
rect eect” for subordianted debt and an “additional ee c t ”f o rs e n i o rd e b t .
Wald test statistics are presented in Table 3.8 for the joint impact of groups of
risk varaibles on issuance spreads.
Yield spreads in both the pre- and post-FDICIA periods were strongly inﬂu-
enced by instrument-speciﬁc characteristics such as call options, CALL,m a t u r i -
ties (MATLT10, MATGT20), and coupon frequencies (COUPON2). Although
it appears that the largest banks among the 50 largest banks paid higher senior
spreads in the pre-FDICIA period and lower senior spreads in the post-FDICIA
43The logit model parameter estimates for the BOPEC variables were also consistent with
the probit model parameter estimates that are reported in Table 3.3.
38Table 3.6
 Parameter Estimates for the Sample Selection Model
of Large U.S. Banking Organizations
Dependent Variable / Deposit Insurance Regime
Explanatory Variables Subordinated Spreads Senior Spreads
Pre-FDICIA Expected Pre-FDICIA Expected Post-FDICIA Expected Post-FDICIA Expected Pre-FDICIA Expected Post-FDICIA Expected
85:Q1-92:Q4 Sign? Issues gt 75 mn Sign? 93:Q1-02:Q4 Sign? Issues gt 75 mn Sign? 85:Q1-92:Q4 Sign? 93:Q1-02:Q4 Sign?
Accounting- and Market- based
Risk Measures
The ratio of non-accruing loans to total assets 
(NATA) -7.075 -11.596 -4.985 -3.931 -23.634 9.565 X
(-1.09) (-1.67) (-0.75) (-0.51) (-2.39) (1.07)
The ratio of accruing loans past due 90 days of
more to total assets  (PDTA) 79.126 X 82.804 X 45.244 X 68.425 X 26.761 X 46.486 X
(1.80) (1.81) (2.38) (2.54) (0.65) (2.75)
The ratio of other real estate owned to total
assets  (OREO) 51.014 X 50.535 X 4.542 X 1.659 X 19.900 X -13.937
(2.87) (2.99) (0.43) (0.15) (0.69) (-0.89)
The absolute value of the difference between
assets and liabilities maturing or repricing within
one year as a proportion of equity value  (AGAP) -0.005 0.009 X -0.006 0.003 X 0.026 X 0.013 X
(-0.31) (0.49) (-0.53) (0.20) (1.45) (0.49)
The ratio of total book liabilities to the sum of the
market value of common stock and the book
value of preferred stock (MKTLEV) 0.007 X 0.004 X 0.044 X 0.045 X -0.043 0.001 X
(0.36) (0.17) (3.62) (3.06) (-2.44) (0.05)
Bank-Specific Risk Measures Interacted
with the Stock Market Excess Returns
The ratio of non-accruing loans to total assets 
interacted with the stock market excess return
(NATA_M) 0.258 X -0.103 -3.310 -1.880 -0.603 -0.875
(0.41) (-0.15) (-3.18) (-1.49) (-0.69) (-0.55)
The ratio of accruing loans past due 90 days of
more to total assets interacted with the stock
market excess return  (PDTA_M) -2.079 -2.178 5.334 X 3.596 X -4.294 -1.152
(-0.48) (-0.54) (2.12) (0.73) (-0.65) (-0.79)
The ratio of other real estate owned to total
assets interacted with the stock market excess
return  (OREO_M) 3.287 X 2.727 X 4.278 X 2.351 X 5.704 X -4.039
(1.78) (1.49) (2.54) (1.03) (3.04) (-1.33)
The absolute value of the difference between
assets and liabilities maturing or repricing within
one year as a proportion of equity value interated
with the stock market excess return (AGAP_M) -0.002 0.0005 X 0.005 X 0.003 X 0.001 X -0.007
(-0.70) (0.17) (1.65) (0.85) (0.18) (-1.40)
The ratio of total book liabilities to the sum of the
market value of common stock and the book
value of preferred stock interacted with the stock
market excess return (MKTLEV_M) -0.0005 -0.002 0.001 X 0.002 X 0.003 X 0.002 X
(-0.25) (-1.10) (0.66) (0.89) (1.37) (1.44)
39                    Table 3.6 Continued
Dependent Variable / Deposit Insurance Regime
Explanatory Variables Subordinated Spreads Senior Spreads
Pre-FDICIA Expected Pre-FDICIA Expected Post-FDICIA Expected Post-FDICIA Expected Pre-FDICIA Expected Post-FDICIA Expected
85:Q1-92:Q4 Sign? Issues gt 75 mn Sign? 93:Q1-02:Q4 Sign? Issues gt 75 mn Sign? 85:Q1-92:Q4 Sign? 93:Q1-02:Q4 Sign?
Other Banking Organization-
Specific Factors
The natural log of total assets (ln(ASSETS)) -0.228 X -0.142 X 0.198 0.058 0.894 -0.084 X
(-0.89) (-0.57) (1.19) (0.34) (3.20) (-2.20)
An indicator variable that equals one if the
banking organization issued debt in the same
seniority grade in the preceding 6 month period,
and zero otherwise (ISSUE_-1) -0.301 X -0.279 X 0.200 -0.028 X 0.363 -0.443 X
(-1.86) (-1.73) (0.82) (-0.12) (0.91) (-1.67)
Business and Bond Market Conditions
Stock Market Excess Return (XR) 0.010 0.032 -0.018 X -0.009 X -0.038 X 0.0101
(0.45) (1.35) (-1.91) (-0.51) (-1.40) (0.80)
The implied stock volatility measure calculated
from option prices traded on the Chicago Board
Option Exchange (MKTVOL)  0.077 X 0.088 X 0.013 X 0.025 X 0.015 X 0.021 X
(4.34) (4.62) (1.67) (1.81) (1.59) (2.65)
Supervisory Pressure
An indicator variable that equals one if the
composite supervisory rating equals 2 (BOPEC2) 0.368 X 0.450 X 0.083 X 0.022 X 0.192 X -0.102
(3.18) (3.73) (2.47) (0.45) (1.13) (-2.15)
An indicator variable that equals one if the
composite supervisory rating equals 3, 4 or 5
(BOPEC345) 0.7480 X 0.7046 X 0.0089 X -0.025 0.662 X -0.631
(3.69) (3.32) (0.12) (-0.20) (2.19) (-2.78)
Instrument Characteristics
An indicator that equals one when an issue has a
call option (CALL) 0.317 X 0.373 X 0.090 X 0.188 X -0.1921 0.1154 X
(1.13) (1.39) (2.85) (2.99) (-0.77) (1.12)
An indicator that equals one when an issue has a
maturity less than ten years (MATLT10) 0.123 X 0.157 X 0.143 X 0.131 X -0.256 0.077 X
(1.39) (1.76) (5.30) (3.49) (-1.24) (1.66)
An indicator that equals one when an issue has a
maturity greater than twenty years (MATGT20) 0.950 X 0.992 X 0.126 X 0.125 X -- 0.348 X
(3.55) (3.84) (3.97) (1.64) (3.13)
An indicator that equals one when the coupon
frequency is monthly (COUPON12) -- -- -0.118 -0.311 -- -0.052
(-1.70) (-2.01) (-1.04)
An indicator that equals one when the coupon
frequency is semi-annually (COUPON2) 0.657 X 0.741 X -0.171 -0.303 -0.248 -0.149
(3.26) (3.72) (-2.56) (-2.45) (-0.89) (-2.11)
The dollar amount of the issue (ISSUESIZE) -0.001 X -0.001 X 0.0002 0.0003 0.001 0.0001
(-1.75) (-1.74) (2.60) (3.49) (0.76) (0.74)
Wald Tests
Wald test statistic for "risk" coefficients jointly
equalling zero 30.83 32.70 77.45 42.49 44.16 19.02
Critical value for the Wald test at the 5 percent
confidence level 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3 18.3
Mills Inverse Ratio
Mills inverse ratio coefficient -1.000 -0.831 0.647 0.240 1.368 -0.406
(-1.72) (-1.50) (1.35) (0.52) (2.33) (-1.67)
Goodness of Fit Measures
Number of Observations 158 151 735 232 104 712
R-Squared  0.74 0.75 0.61 0.69 0.81 0.249
Note:  All specifications include a constant term which was significant at the 5% level.  Year indicator variables, which were equal to one in a specific year of each panel, and zero 
         otherwise were also included though these coefficient estimates are not reported here.  Observed spread regressions are heteroskedastic-consistent.  t-statistics are in parentheses.
40                                                                        Table 3.7
   Parameter Estimates for the Stacked Data Sample Selection Model for Debt Spreads of
                                                 Large U.S. Banking Organizations
Dependent Variable / Deposit Insurance Regim
Pre-FDICIA Period  Post-FDICIA Period
Explanatory Variables
Direct Effect for Expected Additional Effect for  Expected Direct Effect for Expected Additional Effect for  Expected
Subordinated Debt Sign? Senior Debt Sign? Subordinated Debt Sign? Senior Debt Sign?
Accounting- and Market-
based Risk Measures
The ratio of non-accruing loans to total assets 
(NATA) -9.209 -1.644 -10.300 44.070 X
(-1.47) (-0.14) (-1.61) (3.69)
The ratio of accruing loans past due 90 days of
more to total assets  (PDTA) 33.034 X -63.790 34.848 X 17.523 X
(0.96) (-1.22) (1.82) (0.67)
The ratio of other real estate owned to total
assets  (OREO) 51.083 X -32.388 10.737 X -48.416
(2.67) (-1.14) (1.14) (-2.80)
The absolute value of the difference between
assets and liabilities maturing or repricing
within one year as a proportion of equity value 
(AGAP) -0.003 0.024 X -0.011 0.063 X
(-0.16) (1.02) (-0.92) (2.08)
The ratio of total book liabilities to the sum of
the market value of common stock and the book
value of preferred stock (MKTLEV) -0.003 -0.017 0.029 X -0.035
(-0.13) (-0.76) (3.25) (-2.16)
Accounting- and Market- based
Risk Measures Interacted with
the Stock Market Excess Returns
The ratio of non-accruing loans to total assets 
interacted with the stock market excess return
(NATA_M) 0.152 X -0.051 -3.010 2.542 X
(0.21) (-0.05) (-2.98) (1.41)
The ratio of accruing loans past due 90 days of
more to total assets interacted with the stock
market excess return  (PDTA_M) -2.374 -9.783 5.209 X -5.136
(-0.55) (-1.21) (2.08) (-1.81)
The ratio of other real estate owned to total
assets interacted with the stock market excess
return  (OREO_M) 3.718 X 4.002 X 4.166 X -7.373
(1.98) (1.68) (2.65) (-2.24)
The absolute value of the difference between
assets and liabilities maturing or repricing
within one year as a proportion of equity value
interated with the stock market excess return
(AGAP_M) -0.001 -0.001 0.005 X -0.009
(-0.40) (-0.32) (1.48) (-1.68)
The ratio of total book liabilities to the sum of
the market value of common stock and the book
value of preferred stock interacted with the
stock market excess return (MKTLEV_M) -0.001 0.004 X 0.001 X 0.001 X
(-0.71) (1.37) (1.00) (0.66)
41                                                                Table 3.7 Continued
Pre-FDICIA Period Post-FDICIA Period
Explanatory Variables
Direct Effect for Expected Additional Effect for  Expected Direct Effect for Expected Additional Effect for  Expected
Subordinated Debt Sign? Senior Debt Sign? Subordinated Debt Sign? Senior Debt Sign?
Other Banking Organization-
Specific Factors
The natural log of total assets (ln(ASSETS)) 0.242 0.078 0.051 -0.032 X
(1.52) (0.34) (1.24) (-2.44)
An indicator variable that equals one if the
banking organization issued debt in the same
seniority grade in the preceding 6 month
period, and zero otherwise (ISSUE_-1) -0.130 X -0.036 X 0.014 0.217
(-1.02) (-0.12) (0.18) (1.31)
Business and Bond Market
Conditions
Stock Market Excess Return (XR) 0.015 X -0.037 -0.018 0.017 X
(0.66) (-1.09) (-2.24) (1.31)
The implied stock volatility measure
calculated from option prices traded on the
Chicago Board Option Exchange (MKTVOL)
0.054 X -0.045 0.019 X 0.004 X
(2.95) (-2.20) (4.18) (0.68)
Supervisory Pressure
An indicator variable that equals one if the
composite supervisory rating equals 2
(BOPEC2) 0.403 X -0.245 0.035 X -0.033
(3.47) (-1.29) (0.91) (-0.50)
An indicator variable that equals one if the
composite supervisory rating equals 3, 4 or 5
(BOPEC345) 0.632 X -0.040 -0.028 -0.795
(3.26) (-0.12) (-0.37) (-3.32)
Instrument Characteristics
An indicator that equals one when an issue
has a call option (CALL) 0.483 X -- 0.099 X 0.054 X
(2.15) (3.25) (0.55)
An indicator that equals one when an issue
has a maturity less than ten years
(MATLT10) 0.065 X 0.090 X 0.150 X -0.062
(0.69) (0.50) (5.20) (-1.12)
An indicator that equals one when an issue
has a maturity greater than twenty years
(MATGT20) 1.012 X -- 0.084 X 0.202 X
(3.43) (2.38) (1.80)
An indicator that equals one when the
coupon frequency is monthly (COUPON12) -- -- -0.131 0.066 X
(-1.77) (0.63)
An indicator that equals one when the
coupon frequency is semi-annually
(COUPON2) 0.588 X -0.968 -0.224 0.128 X
(2.70) (-0.22) (-3.18) (1.26)
The dollar amount of the issue (ISSUESIZE) -0.001 X 0.002 0.0003 -0.0002 X
(-1.92) (1.81) (4.60) (-1.94)
Mills inverse ratio coefficient 0.016 0.282 0.255 -0.005
(0.05) (0.66) (2.09) (-0.05)
Number of Observations 260 1447
R-Squared  0.734 0.305
Note:  All specifications include a constant term which was significant at the 5% level.  Year indicator variables, which were equal to one in a specific year of each panel, and zero 
         otherwise were also included though these coefficient estimates are not reported here.  Observed spread regressions are heteroskedastic-consistent.  t-statistics are in parentheses.
42Table 3.8
Hypotheses, Wald Test Statistics, Critical Values and Sign Tests for Joint Effects
in the Sample Selection Models
Pre-FDICIA Period:  1986:Q2 - 1992:Q4 Post-FDICIA Period:  1993:Q1 - 1999:Q4
Hypothesis Test Critical Value for Joint Test Critical Value for Joint
Statistic a 5 Percent Effect Statistic a 5 Percent Effect
Confidence Level Confidence Level
H1: The parameter estimates for accounting-
and market-based risk variables jointly
equal zero in the model for subordinated
debt spreads. 26.05 11.1 Positive 43.85 11.1 Positive
H2: The parameter estimates for accounting-
and market-based risk variables jointly
equal zero in the model for subordinated
debt spreads for issues greater than 
 $75 million USD. 28.53 11.1 Positive 29.94 11.1 Positive
H3: The parameter estimates for accounting-
and market-based risk variables jointly
equal zero in the model for senior
debt spreads. 19.37 11.1 Positive 12.94 11.1 Positive
43period, we ﬁnd little inﬂuence of the size of individual issues (ISSUESIZE)o n
senior or subordinated spreads during either period.44
In the pre-FDICIA period, for each type of instrument three out of ﬁve
banking organization-speciﬁc risk variables have the expected sign (Table 3.6).
Only the parameter esimate for OREO in the subordinated debt spread model
is signiﬁcant and of the expected sign. However, the joint eect of the ﬁve
risk variables together is strongly signiﬁcant and of the expected sign for both
types of instruments in a Wald test (Table 3.8). In addition, the parameter
estimates for the most private information among the risk variables considered
(i.e., the BOPECs) are positive for both instruments and strongly signiﬁcant
for subordinated debt. This means that supervisory ratings are to some degree
correlated with knowledge of sophisticated investors. Poor supervisory ratings
do signiﬁcantly increase issuance spreads on subordinated debt.
In contrast, the price of market risk (proxied by XR) has no signiﬁcant
impact in this period. The parameter estimate for XR is not signiﬁcantly dif-
ferent from zero. Moreover, the interaction variables between XR and banking
organization-speciﬁc risk variables are jointly insigniﬁcant for senior debt and
for large and small subordinated debt issues.45
Taken together, the parameter estimates for the sample selection models in
the pre-FDICIA period are largely in line with the forecasts of our model. Both,
subordinated and senior spreads, do react to risk variables. While the senior
spread exclusively reﬂects public information, the subordinate spreads react
more to specialized information of the respective investors as well as to public
information. This is consistent with the existence of an incentive premium and
with the “informed investor hypothesis.” At the same time, we ﬁnd no evidence
of risk aversion on the part of senior bank debt investors.
In the post-FDICIA period, three out of ﬁve of the banking organization-
speciﬁc risk variables have the expected sign in the column for subordinated
debt, and four out of ﬁve of these variables have the expected sign in the column
for senior debt (Table 3.6). A Wald test (Table 3.8) reveals that the joint impact
of the risk proxies remains positive for both debt spreads in the post-FDICIA
period, but that the joint signiﬁcance level has declined for senior spreads in
the pre-FDICIA period.
The parameter estimate on the private information variable, represented by
the BOPEC2, remained positive and signiﬁcant for subordinated debt during
the post-FDICIA period. However, the magnitude of this estimate is only
o n ef o u r t ho ft h er e s p e c t i v en u m b e rf o rt h ep r e -F D I C I Ap e r i o da n dt h ep a -
rameter estimate for BOPEC345 became both statistically and economically
insigniﬁcant. Consistent with this result, the parameter estimate for XR be-
came negative and more statistically signiﬁcant for subordinated spreads in the
post-FDICIA period. Together these ﬁndings suggest that subordinated debt
spreads became less sensitive to the private information held by subordinated
investors and more sensitive to public risk perception after regulatory reforms.46
44The size of an issue may however have an impact on the sensitivity of its spread with
respect to risk parameters, see below.
45Wald test statistics for the joint eect of the interacted risk variables with the market price
of risk were 641, 5.14, and 10.18 for all subordinated debt issuance spreads, for suborindated
debt issuance spreads on issues of at least $75 million, and for senior debt issuance spreads,
respectively. Each of these test statistics is below the 11.1 critical value for a 5 percent
conﬁdence level.
46This result may explain why practitioners complain about “ballooning” of [subordinated]
44The parameter estimates for interaction terms of banking organization-speciﬁc
risk with the market price of risk (XR) for the subordinated debt sample selec-
tion model are also interesting. Wald test statistics for the joint eect of these
interaction terms suggest that the subordinated debt spreads on relatively large
issues are sensitive to a simultaneous increase in bank risk and in the market
price of risk,just as our model would predict. 47 B u tW a l dt e s ts t a t i s t i c sf o r
this joint eect were insigniﬁcant for small subordinated issues of less than $75
million. Perhaps,this is because smaller issues,which are frequently tranches
of medium-term-note programmes,seem to cater to unsophisticated investors,
rather than to investors with special knowledge on the issuing banks. While at
ﬁrst sight the parameter estimates on the interaction terms between the mar-
ket price of risk and banking organization-speciﬁc risks appear to contradict
our model,the exclusion of smaller subordinated debt issues demonstrates that
these parameter estimates nicely conﬁrm the “informed investor” hypothesis.
The parameter estimates for the senior debt sample selection model are
more puzzling. Even though the banking organization-speciﬁc risk variables
are jointly signiﬁcant (Table 3.8),the negative and signiﬁcant signs of the para-
meter estimates for BOPEC2 and BOPEC345 (Table 3.6) suggests that senior
debt of banking organizations in poor ﬁnancial condition may be chronically un-
derpriced. This may partly explain banking organizations’ preference to issue
such debt when they have negative private information. It is also noteworthy
that there was no sign of risk aversion of senior investors in this period either.
4 Discussion
Our estimation of issuance decision models for subordinated and senior debt
demonstrate that U.S. banking organizations issue subordinated debt upon re-
ceipt of good news and senior debt upon receipt of bad news. In the pre-FDICIA
period,both public and private information contribute to this e ect. In the post-
FDICIA period,public information has less impact on banking organizations’
choice among debt instruments,while private information remains inﬂuential,
favoring subordinated (senior) debt when news is good (bad).
These results are consistent with the “informed investor hypothesis” that
claims that banking organizations would issue debt of dierent priority status
to separate investors with dierent,yet unobservable,beliefs on the probability
of bank failure. In contrast,we found no statistical evidence that there were
dierences in risk aversion across investor groups. Moreover,the “signalling
hypothesis” (Barclay and Smith,1995) is clearly rejected. The data simply
do not support the view that banking organizations issue subordinated debt
when they have adverse private information (i.e.,when subordinated debt is
most overvalued). Thus,U.S. banking organizations do not appear to exploit
their informational advantage over investors by opportunistic choice of debt
instruments.
The lack of evidence to support opportunistic debt issuance does not neces-
spreads in bad times “reﬂecting broad skepticism regarding the ﬁnancial health of banking
institutions.” (BoG,1999,p. 16)
47The Wald test statistic is 31.66 compared to a 11.1 (95 percent) critical level. And the
sign test for the joint eects of the interacted bank-speciﬁc risk variables with the market
price of risk was positive in the post-FDICIA period.
45sarily imply that banking organizations behave “idealistically.” One reason why
banking organizations prefer to issue senior debt in bad times may be because
senior debt issues are underpriced. Our empirical ﬁndings suggest that the
senior spread does not react much to bad private, or specialist, information. In
fact, the negative BOPEC coe!cients in the post-FDICIA period imply that the
senior spread may even fall when private news turns bad. It seems that banking
organizations with poor supervisory ratings have managed to issue senior debt
cheaply in the post-FDICIA period.48 In contrast, publicly available informa-
tion did aect the senior spread in both the pre- and post-FDICIA periods.
The subordinated debt spread reacted to both public and specialist, or pri-
vate, information in the pre-FDICIA period. In the post-FDICIA period, the
subordinated spread became less sensitive to specialist, or private, information
(proxied by supervisory ratings), but even more sensitive to public information
(proxied by stock market excess returns). In the language of our model, this
means that the incentive premium has become quantitatively more important.
Because regulatory reforms implemented after the last recession have inﬂu-
enced the size of the incentive premium, it is important to recognize that it
would be inappropriate to use information on subordinated debt spreads from
the pre-FDICIA period to either set a regulatory ceiling on banks’ subordinated
debt yield (see Calomiris, 1999) or to set triggers for prompt corrective actions
(see Evano and Wall, 2000 and 2001; Lang and Robertson, 2000). On the one
hand, the probability of failure has been reduced because of the implementation
of prompt corrective actions by bank supervisors. Such reforms would likely
have reduced the incentive premium. On the other hand, depositor preference
rules subordinate the senior debt investors to depositors and such reforms would
boost the incentive premium. Because it is highly unlikely that these two ef-
fects would exactly cancel one another out, and because our empirical results
suggest that the incentive premiums contained in subordinated debt spreads
are dierent in the pre- and post-FDICIA periods, this implies that ceilings or
triggers must be set using data from only the current regulatory regime.
The stronger inﬂuence of public, rather than specialist, or private, infor-
mation on subordinated debt spreads in the post-FDICIA period is likely a
consequence of the implementation of depositor preference legislation. Deposi-
tor preference rules strongly subordinate senior debt to deposits and this means
that expected recovery rates for senior debt issues are reduced. According to our
model and to our empirical ﬁndings, the subordinated spread thus becomes re-
sponsive to public information, even though the investors who buy subordinated
debt do not themselves believe the public information but hold more favorable,
private views. These results explain why market practitioners complain about
the “ballooning” of subordinated spreads in times of low general market con-
ﬁdence, or why they voice concerns about the di!culties with “disentangling
the separate inﬂuences of market factors and of changes in the risk proﬁle of a
ﬁnancial institution” on the subordinated debt spread.49
48One reason may be that senior investors’ beliefs move with the cycle. These investors
may perceive strong credit growth at a banking organization as good news when, from a
supervisory or private perspective, rapid loan growth may already raise some doubts.
49BoG/DoT (2000), p.78.
465C o n c l u s i o n s
Our theoretical model buttressed by our empirical ﬁndings lead us to conclude
that the yield spread on subordinated debt used in isolation has not been a
straightforward measure of bank risk in either of the periods we considered. At
a minimum, the subordinated yield spread does not reﬂect the best available
information on a banking organizations’ risk (e.g., the information of sophis-
ticated, informed investors). Rather, the relation of the spread to a banking
organization’s true risk is blurred by its sensitivity to publicly perceived risk as,
for example, to general bond market volatility or to stock market excess returns.
This behavior of the subordinated spread is well in line with our model, building
on the “informed investor hypothesis,” and with the existence of an incentive
premium between the “fair” and the measured subordinated spreads.
Paradoxically, the quality of the subordinated debt spread to measure bank-
ing organizations’ risks as they are perceived by most sophisticated investors
has deteriorated after the introduction of FDICIA or, more precisely, of depos-
itor preference rules. With depositor preference rules, the risk characteristics
of senior debt have become more similar to those of subordinated debt; at the
same time, the subordinated debt spread has become (even) more dependent on
factors inﬂuencing the senior spread.
The deterioration of the risk measurement quality of the subordinated spread
after the introduction of depositor preference, however, is likely to understate
the longer term virtues of the reform. Once senior debtors realize that their
claims are subordinated to depositors, senior spreads may well more fully reﬂect
specialist information. Therefore, we expect that senior debt will be held by
more sophisticated investors in the future.
For these reasons, the quality of the subordinated debt spread as a measure of
bank risk should not be judged on the basis of the ﬁrst post-FDICIA decade. In
this period, depositor preference made the subordinated spread react similarly to
the senior spread without having made senior investors su!ciently risk conscious
yet.
Still, our model and the empirical ﬁndings presented here suggest that the
issuance spread on subordinated debt is not likely to ever reﬂect the best risk
information present in the market, i.e. the risk perception of informed investors
who buy subordinated debt. As long as subordinated debt coexists with some
risky senior debt instrument, which is held by less informed (or more risk averse)
investors, subordinated debt will pay an incentive premium. The incentive
premium does not only remunerate sophisticated investors for the perceived risk
they take by buying subordinated debt, but also for some risk they know they are
not taking. Putting it dierently, we might say that subordinated investors are
not only remunerated for the risks they perceive in their — relatively optimistic
— views, but also for the toil and trouble to become informed — and potentially
optimistic — in the ﬁrst place. In an equilibrium in the market for information,
the incentive premium contained in the subordinated spread could thus be seen
as a remuneration to become a sophisticated investor and a potential agent of
market discipline.
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